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THE CREATIVITY PARADOX

Creativity is universally agreed to be a good that copyright law
should seek to promote, yet copyright scholarship and policymaking
have proceeded largely on the basis of assumptions about what it
actually is. When asked to discuss the source of their inspiration,
individual artists describe a process that is intrinsically ineffable. l

• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to Yochai
Benkler, Dan Burk, Margaret Chon, Brett Frischmann, Paul Geller, Andrew Glickman,
Emma Jordan, Sonia Katyal, Leslie Kurtz, Mark Lemley, Michael Madison, David
McGowan, Naomi Mezey, Susan Scafidi, Richard Schur, Madhavi Sunder, Rebecca
Tushnet, Siva Vaidhyanathan, Molly Van Houweling, participants in the Symposium
on Intellectual Property and Social Justice, and participants in a faculty workshop at
the Georgetown University Law Center for their many helpful comments and
suggestions, and to Robert Dowers and Brian Finkelstein for research assistance.
Thanks also to Randy Picker and participants on the Picker MobBlog for a very useful
discussion of an earlier iteration of the model described in Part III.
t For both a summary of the literature in this vein and an example of this
approach to the creative process, see Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and
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Rights theorists of all varieties have generally subscribed to this
understanding, describing creativity in terms of an individual liberty
whose form remains largely unspecified. 2 Economic theorists of
copyright work from the opposite end of the creative process, seeking
to divine the optimal rules for promoting creativity by measuring its
marketable byproducts. 3 But these theorists offer no particular reason
to think that marketable bypro ducts are either an appropriate proxy or
an effective stimulus for creativity (as opposed to production), and
more typically refuse to engage the question. The upshot is that the
more we talk about creativity, the more it disappears from view. At
the same time, the mainstream of intellectual property scholarship has
persistently overlooked a broad array of social science methodologies
that provide both descriptive tools for constructing ethnographies of
creative processes and theoretical tools for modeling them.
In Part II of this Article, I argue that the study of creativity has been
especially problematic for copyright scholars because it sits at the
nexus of three methodological anxieties that copyright scholars
experience acutely. The first anxiety has to do with the question
whether individual creators or broader societal patterns should be the
primary focus of analysis; in intellectual property scholarship, as in

Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945
(2006); see also justin Hughes, The Personality Interests of Authors and Inventors in
Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81 (1998); Russ VerSteeg,
Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARYL. REV. 801, 824-44 (1993).
2 See justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 33744 (1988); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the
Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 272-76 (1998) [hereinafter Netanel, Global
Arena); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE
L.J. 283, 347-62 (1996) [hereinafter Netanel, Democratic Civil Society); see also Wendy
J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1568-72 (1993) (arguing that some
works exert "a grip on the mind that only use of the original can shake," and that in
such cases Lockean proviso justifies copying by second-comers, but assuming that
these cases will be exception rather than rule). I discuss Gordon's more recent work
on this problem in Part V, infra.
3 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTtAL
JUKEBOX 200-01 (2d ed. 2003); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 37-84 (2003); Mark A. Lemley,
The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 9931000 (1997) [hereinafter Lemley, Economics of Improvement); Mark A. Lemley,
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2005)
[hereinafter Lemley, Free Riding); R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free:
Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1001-03
(2003); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
212, 214-19 (2004).
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legal scholarship more generally, this anxiety is experienced in the
form of a required precommitment either to rights-based theories or to
economic analysis. The second anxiety has to do with the appropriate
metric for evaluating creative output, and is experienced in the form of
a required precommitment either to a linear, modernist vision of
creative and cultural progress or to an oppositional stance that rejects
notions of progress, artistic merit, and authorial will entirely. The
third anxiety concerns the relative value of abstract and concrete
components of artistic and intellectual culture, and is experienced in
the form of a required precommitment to abstraction - to the
paramount importance of the idea and the transcendent accessibility of
the public domain - that crosses otherwise rigid philosophical divides.
Each of these methodological anxieties is predicated on a false
binary, but when rights-based theories and economic analysis together
are thought to define the universe of acceptable theoretical approaches
this artificiality is astonishingly hard to see. For all their differences,
rights theories and economic theories of copyright share a set of firstorder methodological commitments that foreclose other, potentially
more fruitful approaches to the interactions between copyright,
creativity, and culture. Questioning those commitments opens the
way for approaches that enable both a more complex consequentialism
and a more concrete specification of the rights that should attend
partIcIpation in creative processes. These approaches in turn point
toward a more sustained engagement with the social science
literatures that legal scholars have largely ignored.
The balance of the Article seeks to put these inSights to use. In Part
III, I sketch a model of creative processes as complex, decentered, and
emergent. Within this model, it is neither individual creators nor
social and cultural patterns that produce artistic and intellectual
culture, but rather the dynamic interactions between them. 4 The
artistic and intellectual value that emerges from these interactions is

4 As will become apparent, contemporary social and cultural theorists adopt
different approaches to the question of "culture," and my intent here is not to endorse
any particular definition, but rather to pursue common threads. Within all of those
approaches, however, culture is broader than the universe of artistic and intellectual
activities with which copyright is concerned. I will use the terms "artistic and
intellectual culture" and "artistic culture" to denote the latter subset of activities.
"Creativity" is another concept that extends well beyond the traditional domain of
copyright. See, e.g., HOWARD GARDNER, CREATING MINDS: AN ANATOMY OF CREATIVITY
SEEN THROUGH THE LIVES OF FREUD, EINSTEIN, PICASSO, STRAVINSKY, ELIOT, GRAHAM, AND
GANDHI (1993) (exploring creativity in art, science, and social activism). Here,
however, I will be concerned principally with ways of understanding creativity in the
context of artistic and intellectual culture.
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simultaneously real and contingent; it is possible to say both that
particular outputs represent valuable additions to collective culture
and that their value is determined by underlying knowledge systems
that are historically and culturally situated. Like other cultural
processes, artistic and intellectual processes are substantially and
importantly shaped by the concrete particulars of expression, the
material attributes of artifacts embodying copyrighted works, and the
spatial distribution of cultural resources. Within a given network of
social and cultural relations, an important and undertheorized
determinant of creative ferment is the play, or freedom of movement,
that the network affords.
Part IV considers the implications of this model for copyright
lawmaking and policy analysis.
Opponents of "copyright
maximalism" have sought to characterize copyright as an intervention
into the "information ecology" that can work both good and harm. A
more skeptical stance toward the methodological commitments of
conventional copyright analysis makes it easier to see (and explain)
why. Those commitments tend to produce both an inflated notion of
copyright's role in stimulating creativity and an insufficiently keen
appreciation of the harms that overly broad copyright can cause.
Decentering creativity, by contrast, tends to foster both a more modest
conception of copyright's role in stimulating creativity and a keener
appreciation of copyright's downside risks. It also fosters a clearer
understanding of the connections between copyright, cultural
progress, and social justice. Contrary to popular perception, this
approach does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that copyright is
harmful per se; to adopt it is not, therefore, to be "against copyright."
It does, however, suggest some essential doctrinal and policy
adjustments, which Part V illustrates.
II.

THREE METHODOLOGICAL ANXIETIES

Copyright theory and jurisprudence are powerfully structured by a
set of interlinked anxieties about the appropriate tools for
understanding the interactions between copyright and culture. Those
anxieties, which concern the justification for assigning rights, the
nature of the progress that copyright is meant to promote, and the
mechanics of creative processes, spring from a set of first-order
methodological commitments associated with liberal political theory.
They define the boundaries of copyright's epistemological universe in
a way that excludes many other approaches to investigating and
theorizing about creative processes. The result is that despite the
voluminous amount of copyright scholarship now being published,
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copyright theory remains impoverished in important and outcomedetermining ways.
A.

Rights or Economics

Within the mainstream of copyright scholarship it has been taken as
self-evident that a grand theory of the field must be grounded either in
a theory of rights or in a theory of economic analysis. Some rights
theorists seek to derive the basis for copyright from the philosophy of
property rights; others prefer a vision of copyright grounded in
principles of expressive liberty and deliberative democracy. Economic
theorists vie with one another to discover new disciplinary sub-strands
within economics that might cause the shapes of demand curves to
shift, or alter the payout matrices in game theory tables. Proponents
of these approaches vigorously debate among themselves whether one
approach or the other is superior. I do not intend to take sides in that
debate, but rather to challenge the implicit requirement of
precommitment to one side or the other. The rights-economics binary
elides another sort of consequentialism, which has room within it for a
more complex and productive approach to the specification of rights.
The rights-economics binary within copyright theory maps neatly to
the classic divide in social and cultural theory between theories
concerned primarily with accounts of individual agency and those
concerned primarily with accounts of social ordering. Consistent with
Kant's categorical imperative, rights theorists focus predominantly on
specifying, via logical derivation, the sort of treatment that individuals
(whether authors or users) should have a right to expect from a
copyright regime. Economic theorists, meanwhile, profess themselves
to be concerned primarily with overall efficiency in the production
and distribution of social resources, and with factors that might
produce distortions from the optimum production and distribution.
As one might expect, the question whether creativity is produced
largely from within or stimulated predominantly from without is a
good question only if the answer must be one or the other. In recent
decades, social and cultural theory have sought to move beyond the
self-SOciety divide by articulating approaches that emphaSize the
evolving, emergent relations between the two. In the main, copyright
scholarship has not kept pace with these developments. For the most
part, copyright scholars perSistently overlook other (nonphilosophical, non-economic) literatures that study artistic and
intellectual cultures as phenomena that emerge at the intersections
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between self and society.s As a result, they tend to ignore wellestablished humanities and social science methodologies that are
available for investigating the origins of artistic and cultural
innovation. These methodologies are diverse but share a number of
common attributes. They prize empiricism above logical derivation
from so-called first principles, and the forms of empiricism that are
prized most highly tend to be ethnographic rather than quantitative.
They generate theoretical models of social and cultural processes that
are both rigorous and complex, and that tend not to be amenable to
mathematical reduction.
They recognize that because cultural
practices and institutions are evolving and endogenously constituted,
scholars wishing to understand them must pay careful attention not
only to the forces of rational self-interest but also to practices of
rhetoric, representation, and classification. Finally, they emphasize
the importance of the material realities of everyday practice.
Why do both rights theorists and economic theorists of copyright
assume shared primacy, and why do they tend to find literatures and
methodologies that focus on the interactions between self and culture
so uncongenial? One explanation for the primacy of rights theories
and economic theories within the copyright literature is that such
theories are indispensable prerequisites for constructing overarching
normative frameworks. 6 When pressed on the question of engagement
with the particulars of creative processes, scholars of both persuasions
sometimes respond that richer descriptive and theoretical models of
creativity do not themselves dictate any particular arrangement of legal
rules. Deriving such rules requires a theory of the good that we are
trying to pursue; that theory, or so we are told, can come only from
rights-based theories or from economics. Each side then claims that
the other really lacks normative sufficiency. Rights theorists note that
economic analysis requires a priori specification of some utility
function, while economic theorists observe that rights theorists are
equally dependent on unproved and unprovable preconceptions about
natural rights. This disagreement, however, reveals broader agreement
on the importance of identifying a small set of first principles,
encoding first-order normative choices, from which a normatively
compelling framework for copyright can then be derived in relatively
neutral fashion. The best explanation that I have seen for copyright
theorists' aversion to cultural theory likewise highlights an assumption

As Part Il.B discusses, there are, of course, some notable exceptions.
See Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 3, at lO31-32; David McGowan, Copyright
Nonconsequentialism, 69 Mo. L. REV. 1,1-5 (2004).
5

6
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about first principles shared by copyright theorists on both sides of the
rights-economics divide: to emphasize the endogenous relationship of
self to culture is to introduce a large set of unruly complications that
undermine foundational premises about individual autonomy, and
that threaten to undo policy analysis entirely. 7
Taking these explanations together, the purported advantage of
rights theories and economic theories is neither precisely that they are
normative nor precisely that they are scientific, but that they do
normative work in a scientific way. Their normative heft derives from
a small number of formal principles and purports to concern questions
that are a step or two removed from the particular question of policy
to be decided. With respect to copyright in particular, neither rights
nor utility functions need be specified directly in terms of the content
of culture. These theories manifest a quasi-scientific neutrality as to
copyright law that consists precisely in the high degree of abstraction
with which they facilitate thinking about processes of cultural
transmission. The commitment to first-order principles of neutrality
and abstraction helps to explain copyright scholars' aversion to the
complexities of cultural theory, which persistently violates those
principles. 8 It is instructive to contrast that aversion with the current
vogue for "complex systems" theories drawn from the natural
sciences.
Copyright scholars are increasingly preoccupied with
theories that stress naturally occurring properties such as complexity
and path-dependence, including the emerging science of networks,
evolutionary biology, and the theory of genetic memes. 9 It is hard to

7 A particularly nice statement of this problem appears in YOCHAI BENKLER, THE
WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM
278-85 (2006). Unlike many others, Benkler does not duck the problem of culture,
but instead tries to work around it by specifying a set of minimal conditions vis-it-vis
culture that cohere most closely with the aims of liberal political theory.
8 This hierarchy of value also explains a great deal about intellectual property
theorists' traditional disdain for trademark law, which has never fit neatly within any
rights-based framework and which requires an economic analysis that is irreducibly
self-referential.
9 See ].M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY (1998); Thomas F.
Cotter, Prolegomenon to a Memetic Theory of Copyright: Comments on Lawrence Lessig's
The Creative Commons, 55 FLA. L. REV. 779 (2003); Susan P. Crawford, The Biology of
the Broadcast Flag, 25 HASTINGS COMM. &: ENT. L.J. 603,621-29 (2003); Edward Lee,
The Public's Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on the Government's Power to
Control Public Access Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 55 HASTINGS L.]. 91, 14247, 170-76 (2003); Daniel F. Spulber &: Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of
Networks as Complex Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1687
(2005); see also BENKLER, supra note 7 (using network science to inform an argument
grounded in political theory); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and "Market Power"
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avoid concluding that these theories are attractive to many scholars
because they offer the perceived certainty of scientific law, and
therefore enable discussion of cultural complexity and pathdependence in terms that avoid engaging with questions of meaning.
The problem with this approach is that it is too narrow both
descriptively and normatively. Let us return to the argument that
deriving a normative model of copyright requires a theory of rights or a
theory of economics. It is important, first, to understand precisely
what this argument claims. For rights theorists, the claim appears to
be a relatively straightforward one about the importance of having a
deontological political philosophy in which normative arguments can
be grounded. In the case of economics, the parallel claim is not nearly
as clear. Many practitioners of "law and economics" seem to think
that they are doing (social) science as opposed to mere philosophy.
But by that measure the argument about the normative superiority of
economics is a very odd one. If "economics" is understood to denote a
social science methodology, then its normative valence is no greater
than that of, say, SOciology or anthropology. If the claimed superiority
of economics is to have any basis, it must rest on a link to political
philosophy that those other disciplines presumptively lack. Within
the framework of liberal political philosophy in which legal scholars
are trained, the obvious candidate is utilitarianism, and so that is the
political philosophy with which law and economics has become
identified.
The contention, then, is that even if rights-based theories and
utilitarian theories are lacking in descriptive power, together they
cover the normative waterfront. Within economic reasoning, this
move operates as a naked form of intellectual irredentism, which holds
both that any consequentialist theory of the good must be amenable to
reformulation in the language of economics and that a judicious
sprinkling of economically derived jargon is sufficient to effectuate the
reformulation.
Here the linked anxieties about neutrality and
abstraction come bubbling to the surface; the idea seems to be that
utilitarian analysis is the prototype case of consequentialism,1O a
position which it claims both by virtue of its high degree of abstraction
and its ability to define away problems of judgment. Rights theorists
subscribe to these assumptions largely out of disinterest in and
in the Marketplace of Ideas, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT 149 (Fran~ois
Leveque &: Howard Shelanski eds., 2005) (using network science to inform an
argument grounded in First Amendment theory).
10 On prototypes, see GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS:
WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 40-54 (1987).
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dissatisfaction with consequentialist reasoning generally; for rights
theorists, all consequentialist theories are normatively indeterminate.
But the underlying assumption (on both sides) that any
consequentialist theory must be grounded in economics is false. The
universe of consequentialist theories is not coextensive with the
universe of utilitarian ones.
In particular, the tendency to conflate consequentialism with
utilitarianism ignores versions of consequentialism that use rules other
than utility maximization to decide on good outcomes.
Rule
consequentialism enables formulation of instrumental goals without
imposing the artificial constraint that the resulting improvements in
human well-being be amenable to expression in terms of utility, and
therefore perfectly or even approximately commensurable. And it
enables the discussion and definition of the rights that human beings
should be entitled to expect without imposing the artificial constraint
that those rights be logically derivable from a small handful of first
principles.
Among the various versions of nonutilitarian or rule
consequentialism, I would like to focus on the capabilities approach
developed by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. II This approach
takes as its lodestar the fulfillment of human freedom, and defines
freedom in terms of the development of affirmative capabilities for
flourishing. Thus defined, freedom is not simply a function of the
absence of restraint, but also depends critically on access to resources
and on the availability of a sufficient variety of real opportunities. 12
Because of these requirements, freedom and equality are integrally
connected within the capabilities approach. Equality is not simply a
matter of making distributive adjustments here and there once the
basic structure of entitlements is decided according to some other set
of criteria. Substantive equality is a fundamental concern and a
normative constraint on both rule structures and policy
recommendations. 13 Within the literature on copyright theory there is
11 See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999) [hereinafter SEN,
DEVELOPMENT]; AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992) [hereinafter SEN,
INEQUALITY]; Martha C. Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, in liBERALISM AND
THE GOOD 203 (R. Bruce Douglass et al. eds., 1990); Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory
of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315 (2004) [hereinafter Sen, Elements]; Human
Development and Capability Association, http://www.capabilityapproach.coml
Home.php (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
12 See SEN, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 11, at 70-85; Nussbaum, supra note 11, at
228-34; Sen, Elements, supra note 11, at 330-36.
13 See SEN, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 11, at 87-110; SEN, INEQUALITY, supra note
11, at 21-26.
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evidence of a recent turn toward explicit adoption of the capabilities
approach. Leading works include Yochai Benkler's treatment of the
linkages between information policy, information markets, and human
freedom; Margaret Chon's work on intellectual property and
development; and Madhavi Sunder's exploration of the intersections
between intellectual property, the Internet protocol, and identity
politics. 14 The theories advanced by these scholars differ in many
respects, but are consistent in their commitment to at least the
principles just described.
Consequentialism in this vein diverges from the prevailing modes of
theorizing about copyright and its relation to cultural policy in four
important respects. First, it holds normative commitments closer to
the surface, and consequently more available for interrogation. In this
it compares favorably with economic theories, which tend to skip over
the task of specifying initial utility functions. Second, the capabilities
approach resists abstraction from the conditions of everyday life, and
demands instead that claimed rights be defined to include the
conditions necessary for real people to take full advantage of them. It
therefore both demands resort to and provides a clear point of entry
for the messy social science methodologies described above. Third,
the capabilities approach embraces complexity and ambiguity; it does
not expect resolution of large policy questions to be easy.15
Accordingly, it is more capable of encompassing and articulating a
framework for resolving the competing claims of incommensurable
goods, and for that reason it is especially well suited to theorizing
about rights in culture. Finally, because it emphasizes substantive
equality as a condition of human freedom, the capabilities approach is
especially well suited to theorizing about the linkages between rights,
enabling conditions, and social justice.

14 BENKLER, supra note 7; Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development
Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006); Madhavi Sunder, Ip 3 , 59 STAN. L. REV. 257
(2006); see also MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 54-78 (1996)
(conSidering problems in property theory in light of Nussbaum's criteria for human
flourishing). In his early work on the fair use doctrine, Terry Fisher advanced a
compelling account of the good life, and of copyright's relevance to attaining it, that
resembles Nussbaum's later account of "Aristotelian social democracy" in some
respects, but then chose to tackle the problem of assigning copyright entitlements
against an idealized baseline condition of equal resources. See William W. Fisher III,
Reconstmcting the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1745-66 (1988); see also
William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1203, 1215-18 (1998).
15 See Sen, Elements, supra note 11, at 322-23.
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Application of the capabilities approach to matters of copyright and
cultural policy is complicated, however, by other considerations that
relate to broader cross-currents in twentieth century intellectual
history. Both Sen and Nussbaum are firmly committed to locating the
capabilities approach within the evolving traditions of liberal political
economy and philosophy. 16 Benkler likewise situates his work
squarely within those traditions. 17 That formulation, I think, obscures
the extent of the intellectual shift that the capabilities approach
represents. If this is liberalism, it is a version that salvages the core
substantive commitments to individual dignity and well-being at the
cost of some equally core methodological commitments. At the very
least, then, the fit is imperfect. Exclusive identification with the
liberal philosophical tradition also has costs. Nussbaum and Sen, and
Benkler to a lesser degree, appear concerned to show that their
approaches do not derive from, or require endorsement of, a
standardless postmodernism.1 8 Yet (as Part II.B will discuss) that
stance rejects a rather large amount of recent thinking on the question
of culture and its relationship to the questions of freedom and equality
with which the capabilities approach is centrally concerned.
Chon and Sunder, in contrast, think that a deeper and more
rigorous engagement with postmodernist explorations of culture is
essential to evaluating the effects of copyright on human flourishing in
the way that the capabilities approach requires. Chon seeks to craft a
theory of intellectual property rights that is sensitive to postmodernist
understandings of the relationships between culture, power, and
economic development; Sunder, to craft a theory of intellectual
property ownership that is senSltlve both to postmodernist
understandings of identity and to the postmodernist critique of culture
as fixity. Like Chon and Sunder, I think that there is much to be
gained from this sort of intellectual hybridization. The perception of
"postmodernism" as requiring both a boundless relativism and a deepseated cynicism about human potential is a caricature; strands within

16 See SEN, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 11, at 292-97; SEN, INEQUALITY, supra note
11, at xi; Martha C. Nussbaum, Public Philosophy and International Feminism, 108
ETHICS 762, 770-72 (I 998) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Public Philosophy I; Nussbaum,
supra note II.
17 BENKLER, supra note 7, at 18-20.
18 See SEN, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 11, at 247; Nussbaum, Public Philosophy,
supra note 16, at 770-73; see also BENKLER, supra note 7, at 279-85 (asserting that
liberal political theory must confront culture and advancing account of culture
developed from within liberal political theory).
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the emerging postmodernist tradition are deeply humanist. 19 The
intellectual stance that I have in mind, and that I take Chon's and
Sunder's work to represent, is neither strictly liberal nor strictly
postmodern, nor is it simply interdisciplinary, since the boundaries it
crosses do not divide merely disciplines. 20 At least as applied to
copyright problems, it lends the capabilities approach a richness and a
concreteness that this approach otherwise lacks.

B.

Merit or Relativism (or the Progress Problem)

Copyright's stated purpose is to promote progress, but how is it to
do this? Both rights theorists and economic theorists are deeply
suspicious of the role of value judgments about artistic merit in
justifying the recognition and allocation of rights. They have therefore
struggled mightily to articulate neutral, process-based models of
progress that manage simultaneously to avoid enshrining particular
criteria of artistic and intellectual merit and to ensure that the "best"
artistic and intellectual outputs will succeed. For the most part, they
have refused to engage the critique of this enterprise offered by
scholars grounded in postmodernist social and cultural theory, and
instead have characterized that critique as advocating a pernicious
relativism. Here again, this stance exposes a shared epistemological
universe that is relatively narrow, and that forecloses potentially
fruitful avenues of inquiry into the processes of cultural production.
The canonical statement of the modernist anxiety about the twin
dangers of judgment and relativism is Justice Holmes's warning that:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only
to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations. . .. At the one extreme some works of
genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty
would make them repulsive until the public had learned the

19 Both Chon and Sunder are keenly aware of this. David Lange was one of the
earliest to note the humanist quality of postmodemist accounts of culture. See David
Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in
the Post-Literate Millennium, LAw &: CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at l39 (reading
Foucault's essay on author-function as powerful enabler of creative and expressive
freedom). Chon and Sunder, however, read postmodemist social and cultural theory
as plaCing relatively greater emphasis on equality as an independent and sometimes
countervailing value to the cultural liberty that Lange identified. Chon, supra note 14,
at 2888-2909; Sunder, supra note l4, at 313-2l.
20 Keith Aoki would describe this stance as a syncretic one.
See Keith Aoki,
Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference to
Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 UC DAVIS L. REV. 717, 719 (2007).
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new language in which their author spoke. . .. At the other
end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to
a public less educated than the judge. 21
On its face, this statement works hard to avoid enshrining particular
criteria of artistic and intellectual merit. But it presumes that they
exist, and that appropriate judgments will be made by the audiences
competent to do so, as long as copyright does not attempt to pick
winners in the marketplace of ideas.
In the last two decades, this formulation of copyright's role in
facilitating cultural production has come under sustained challenge
from scholars grounded in postmodernist social and cultural theory.
Peter ]aszi, David Lange, and Martha Woodmansee explored the
modernist narrative's implicit dependence upon a vision of the
solitary, romantic author, while Margaret Chon interrogated its
implicit presumption of linear, teleological progress. 22 ] ames Boyle
illustrated the ways in which the construct of the romantic author is
deployed to legitimate frameworks of economic domination, while
Rosemary Coombe sought to rehabilitate those marginalized as passive
consumers of the fruits of romantic authorship.23 Niva Elkin-Koren
extended these critiques into the realm of political theory, offering an

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.s. 239, 251-52 (1903).
Peter jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective
Creativity, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL ApPROACHES IN LAw AND
LiTERATURE 29 (Martha Woodmansee &: Peter jaszi eds., 1994); Peter jaszi, Toward a
Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455 (1991);
Lange, supra note 19; Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect:
Recovering
Collectivity, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP, supra, at 14; Martha Woodmansee,
The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the
"Author," 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984); Margaret Chon, Postmodem
"Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97
(1993); see also Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the
Fiction of the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L REV. 725 (1993) (critiquing copyright's construct
of fixed, autonomous work).
23 JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAw AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996); ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, ApPROPRtATlON, AND LAw 58 (1998); see also
SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE? ApPROPRIATION AND AUTHENTICITY IN AMERICAN
LAw (2005) (exploring relationships between cultural products and communal
identities); Keith Aoki, Adrift in the Intertext: Authorship and Audience "Recoding"
Rights - Comment on Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement
and the Fiction of the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L REV. 805 (1993) (considering political
implications of postmodernist critique).
21

22
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account of "progress" as inhering in widely distributed, participatory
acts of social meaning-making. 24
Rather than treating the postmodernist critique of authorship,
originality, and progress as an invitation to inquire more closely into
the cultural production of knowledge, copyright theory has tended to
marginalize this critique. This process sometimes begins with an act
of misclassification, in which the postmodernist critique is identified
with "postmodernist literary criticism."25 That characterization vastly
oversimplifies the range of literatures on which the critique relies. It
also ignores the fact that the critique of the modernist model of
cultural production includes other strands within the copyright
literature, including most notably the important work by Lange and
Jessica Litman on the relation of the "public domain" to cultural
production and by Michael Madison on the ways in which patterns of
social and cultural organization shape prevailing understandings of
fair use. 26 Misclassification is followed by misreading. "Postmodernist
literary criticism" (or more generally "postmodernism") is taken as
holding that texts have no authors and no meaning whatsoever, and
the postmodernist critique of copyright is taken as adopting a similar
stance. The allegation that doctrinal overbreadth stifles productive
borrowing is taken as stating a claim about the requirements of
"postmodern art" (or "appropriation art"), which is assumed to differ
in fundamental ways from "art" more generally.

24 Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change:
A Democratic Approach to
Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L]. 215 (1996).
25 See jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 ]. COPYRIGHT SOC'y
U.S.A. 1, 7-8 (1997); Hughes, supra note 1, at 90; justin Hughes, Size Matters (or
Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L REV. 575, 621 (2005); see also Mark A.
Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L REV. 873, 878
n.35 (1997) ("Treating Boyle's book as an exercise in linear logic is perhaps unfair,
given its postmodem character.").
26 David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter
1981, at 147; jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORYL]. 965 (1990); Michael].
Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L REV. 1525
(2004). Lange's and Litman's works are part of the mainstream copyright canon, but
their embrace has required a narrow reading of both authors' arguments. Both works
tend to be understood as being about what should be "in the public domain," rather
than more generally about the nature of creative processes and the ways in which legal
categories shape our understanding of those processes. Litman in particular did not
position her own work as animated by postmodemist theory, and I am quite certain
that she would not describe it that way. Lange's later work on the public domain
comes closer to adopting the sort of stance with respect to postmodemism that I am
suggesting. See Lange, supra note 19, at 148-51. Madison's work draws eclectically
from a number of different literatures.
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Thus characterized, the postmodernist critique of copyright is
interpreted as setting up another either/or choice, this time between
merit and a pernicious cultural and moral relativism. To avoid
relativism, one must choose merit. But this choice creates enormous
methodological difficulties of its own. In particular, to avoid the
tension that endorsement of a substantive vision of progress would
create with principles of value-neutrality and negative liberty, both
rights theorists and economic theorists retreat to a process-based
vision of merit-based selection. For economic theorists this vision is
encapsulated in the maxim de gustibus non est disputandum; for rights
theorists, the starting point is the commitment to intellectual and
expressive freedom. Both versions presume that, under conditions of
fair competition, personal decisions about information consumption
will produce results that make sense - that the truest and most
beautiful works will be the ones that appeal most strongly to the
citizen's deliberative faculty, or to the consumer's enlightened selfinterest. Since it is far from obvious that the real world actually works
this way, the turn to process rapidly generates its own anxieties, which
revolve around whether the communicative marketplace actually will
work as the models predict and what exactly fair competition is.
Here again, surface disagreement between rights theorists and
economic theorists conceals broader agreement on first prinCiples.
The unspoken and increaSingly frantic dialectic between fidelity to
and distrust of the marketplace model of communication that
animates so much of copyright theory is premised on a first-order
commitment to a rationalist philosophy that conceives of knowledge
as transcendent and absolute, rather than contingent and evolving.
Both rights-based theories and economic analysis are deeply rooted in
Anglo American liberal political philosophy, which in turn sits within
a tradition of Enlightenment rationalism extending from Kant to
Whatever their internal
Weber to Habermas and Rawls.
disagreements, works within this tradition presume the existence of
truths amenable to rational discourse and deliberation. They disagree
chiefly on comparatively trifling questions about which market Signals
are accurate and which are mere distortions.
But deeper engagement with "postmodernist" social and cultural
theory need not lead to the debilitating relativism that copyright
scholars fear. These literatures are better understood as opening the
way for an account of the nature and development of knowledge that
is both far more robust and far more nuanced than anything that
liberal political philosophy has to offer. This account seeks to
understand how existing knowledge systems have evolved, and how
they are encoded and enforced. It explores the dialectic between
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settled truths and disruptive upheavals, and seeks to illumine the ways
in which particular innovations become accepted as truth or enshrined
as artistically valid. This is not to suggest that social and cultural
theorists offer a single account of "culture"; to the contrary, questions
about the nature and origins of culture and the patterns of cultural
change are hotly debated.27 What these literatures offer is something
far more valuable: a toolkit for exploring questions about culture in
ways that liberal political philosophy does not allow. And that toolkit
is an indispensable prerequisite for understanding and evaluating the
cultural work that a system of copyright does.
Social and cultural theories that emphaSize the contingent, iterative,
and performative development of knowledge are rooted in several
philosophical traditions that liberalism has resisted, and of which
copyright scholars have remained largely skeptical. One tradition that
is particularly useful for studying, a legal regime meant to promote
artistic and intellectual progress extends from Nietzsche through
Heidegger and Foucault to a number of contemporary cultural
theorists, and emphasizes the social construction of systems of
knowledge. Social theory in this tradition seeks to understand the
evolution of systems of knowledge and the ways in which knowledge
both undergirds and is shaped by assertions of power. 28 Another
tradition extends from Marx through the Frankfurt School of cultural
theory, and applies Marxist principles of political economy to the
analYSis of culture. 29 A third tradition is broadly phenomenological; it

27 For a useful overview, see generally TERRY EAGLETON, THE IDEA OF CULTURE
(2000). Eagleton views "culture" as encompaSSing most of the binary definitions
within which others have sought to contain it.
28 For some of the leading approaches, see generally PIERRE BOURDlEU, THE FIELD
OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION (1993) [hereinafter BOURDlEU, CULTURAL PRODUCTION];
PIERRE BOURDlEU, PRACTICAL REASON: ON THE THEORY OF ACTION 3-13 (1998); MICHEL
FOUCAULT, AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWlEDGE 21-70 (1972); MICHEL FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 135-228 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977);
ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTliNE OF THE THEORY OF
STRUCTURATION (1984). Heidegger responded to the indeterminacy of knowledge by
positing the existence of, and arguing for fidelity to, a pre-technical essence of being.
See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, The Question Concerning Technology, in BASIC WRITINGS 307
(David Farrell Krell ed., 2d ed. 1993). This approach has been justly criticized for
falling into many of the same errors as natural rights thinking.
29 See Theodor Adorno &: Max Horkheimer, The Culture Industry: Enlightenment
as Mass Deception, in THE CUlTURAL STUDIES READER 29 (Simon During ed., 1993);
Antonio Gramsci, The Intellectuals, in SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 5-23
(Quintin Hoare &: Geoffrey Nowell Smith trans., 1971); cf. BENKLER, supra note 7, at
280-81 (considering lessons that liberal tradition might derive from Gramsci's theory
of cultural hegemony).
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interrogates the origins of cognition and perception, and explores the
limits of language as a means of representation. Some useful strands
within this tradition include Thomas Kuhn's study of the evolution of
scientific knowledge,3D work by sociologists and anthropologists such
as Clifford Geertz and Erving Goffman that analyzes culture as a
process enacted by its participants,3l and research by cognitive
theorists that advances a model of human cognition and
communication as embodied and spatially situated. 32 In different
ways, each of these approaches seeks to understand how culture
emerges from perception, practice, and discourse.
Perhaps the most important point that tends to be overlooked by
copyright scholars (and legal scholars more generally) is that none of
these literatures has as its stated purpose the "trashing" of
"conventional wisdom." To the contrary, all of the theoreticians
mentioned above have recognized and acknowledged that shared
premises generating predictable rhythms are essential to the operation
of a functioning society. In this their work is distinct from more
textually oriented postmodernist thought that emphaSizes the radical
indeterminacy of the sign. It bears emphasizing that postmodernist
thought is not monolithic, and deconstruction is not its core
enterprise.
Postmodernist literary theory and art criticism are
disciplines that focus narrowly on the interpretation of texts; equating
these disciplines with postmodernist social and cultural theory more
generally is a mistake. But the same copyright scholars who can
generate lengthy disquisitions on the distinctions between Locke and
Mill, or Habermas and Rawls, or Demsetz and Arrow have tended to

30

THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).

31

See Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,

in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3 (1973); ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF
SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
32 See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE
EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999) [hereinafter LAKOFF
& JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH]; GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS
WE LIVE By (1980).
Lakoff and johnson note that their challenge to analytic
philosophy echoes earlier challenges issued by john Dewey, who advocated
interrogation of the constitutive roles of habit, custom, and embodied experience, and
by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who argued that human perception and thought are
fundamentally embodied. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra, at
97. See generally JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE (1925);jOHN DEWEY, HUMAN
NATURE AND CONDUCT (1922);jOHN DEWEY, THE INFLUENCE OF DARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY
(1910); MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MERLEAU-PONTY 47-80,
138-81 (Alden L. Fisher ed., 1969); MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF
PERCEPTION (Colin Smith trans., 1962).
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lump all things "postmodernist" together and equate them with
nihilism.
Instead, within each of these scholarly approaches what is most
important is that settled modes of knowing not become entrenched
and calcified. This concern resonates deeply with copyright law's
imperative to foster progress, but demands two important
modifications to the conventional understanding of that imperative.
First, it requires that "progress" be assigned a more open-ended
interpretation. Stripped of its association with modernist teleologies,
progress consists, simply, in that which causes knowledge systems to
come under challenge and sometimes to shift. Second, and precisely
because the postmodernist understanding of progress abandons the
comforting fiction of modernist teleologies, a postmodernist approach
to knowledge demands careful attention to social, cultural, and legal
mechanisms for evaluating, rewarding, and internalizing progress.
Recognizing that those mechanisms are always already normatively
compromised, it directs our attention to the value judgments that they
enact. It thereby foregrounds the complex linkages between and
among progress, power, and participation.
It is unsurprising, then, that these scholarly approaches have
produced many of the works that have become foundational to the
study of the creative and intellectual processes, practices, and
institutions that we call "science" and "art." On the scientific side,
perhaps the foremost of these is Kuhn's study of the development of
scientific knowledge, and in particular the distinction that Kuhn
developed between "normal science" and a "paradigm shift" in
generally accepted scientific understanding. 33 More recently, the
umbrella field known as science and technology studies ("STS") has
sought to illuminate the social construction of both scientific
knowledge and technical artifacts using the tools of social and cultural
theory.34 On the "artistic" side of the ledger, important works include
Foucault's exploration of the ways in which the modern construct of
"authorship" structures public discourse about creativity, authenticity,

33

See KUHN, supra note 30,

at

23-5l.

For some leading examples of this approach, see generally WIEBE E. BUKER, OF
BICYCLES, BAKELITES, AND BULBS: TOWARD A THEORY OF SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE (1995);
DONNA]' HARAWAY, SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE
(1991); BRUNO LATOUR, THE PASTEURISATION OF FRANCE (Alan Sheridan & John Law
trans., 1988); THE SOCtAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS (Wiebe E. Bijker
et al. eds., 1987); A SOCIOLOGY OF MONSTERS: ESSAYS ON POWER, TECHNOLOGY AND
DOMINATION Oohn Law ed., 1991).
34
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and meaning;35 writings by feminist literary theorists like Laurie Finke
and Mary O'Connor, who have sought to relocate authorship within
an ongoing process of dialogue;36 Pierre Bourdieu's and Howard
Becker's explorations of the ways in which expertise and authority
shape cultural production;37 and Walter Benjamin's meditation on
reproduction of cultural artifacts and control of cultural meaning. 38
They include, as well, the work of a number of cultural and media
theorists who have sought to trace the effects of mass culture on the
construction of cultural identities and to probe the ways in which
cultural identities shape relations between self and community.39
Finally, scholars from a variety of disciplines have sought to
understand creativity across the art-science divide. Researchers in
psychology and education have produced a vibrant literature on the
social, cultural, and psychological factors that shape creativity, while
philosophers as disparate as John Dewey, Nelson Goodman, and Jacob
Bronowski have explored the phenomenology of creativity in a more
holistic fashion. 40
Copyright theorists should be centrally concerned with works such
as these, which probe processes of cultural production and cultural

35 Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY,
PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS 113 (Donald F. Bouchard ed., Donald F.
Bouchard &: Sherry Simon trans., 1977).
36 See generally LAURIE FINKE, FEMINIST THEORY, WOMEN'S WRITING (1992); Mary
O'Connor, Subject, Voice, and Women in Some Contemporary Black American Women's
Writing, in FEMINISM, BAKHTIN, AND THE DIALOGIC 199 (Dale M. Bauer &: Susan ]aret
McKinstry eds., 1991); Carys]. Craig, Reconstructing the Author-Self: Some Feminist
Lessons for Copyright Law, 15]. GENDER, Soc. POL'Y &: LAw (forthcoming 2007).
37 HOWARD S. BECKER, ART WORLDS (1982); BOURDIEU, CULTURAL PRODUCTION,
supra note 28.
38 Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in
ILLUMINATIONS 219 (Hannah Arendt ed., 1968).
39 Leading examples include ARJUN ApPADURAI, MODERNITY AT URGE: CULTURAL
DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION (l996);]OHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE (1987); Stuart
Hall, Encoding/Decoding, in THE CULTURAL STUDIES READER 507 (Simon During ed., 2nd
ed. 1993); see also Sunder, supra note 14; Madhavi Sunder, Intellectual Property and
Identity Politics: Playing with Fire, 4]. GENDER RACE &: JUST. 69 (2000) [hereinafter
Sunder, Identity Politicsl.
40 On the psychology of creativity, see generally TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN
CONTEXT (1996); MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLow AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
DISCOVERY AND INVENTION (1996); GARDNER, supra note 4; THE INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY Oames C. Kaufman &: Robert S. Sternberg eds., 2006); DEAN
KEITH SIMONTON, ORIGINS OF GENIUS: DARWINIAN PERSPECTIVES ON CREATIVITY (1999).
On the phenomenology of creativity, see generally ]ACOB BRONOWSKI, THE ORIGINS OF
KNOWLEDGE AND IMAGINATION (1978);]OHN DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE (1934); NELSON
GOODMAN, WAYSOFWORLDMAKING (1978).
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change from a variety of empirical and theoretical angles. Here,
however, another difficulty typically arises. Careful exploration of
these topics requires confronting not only preconceptions about
progress, but also preconceptions about creative processes and
practices. Copyright theorists of all persuasions tend to envision these
processes as exercises in abstraction. The commitment to abstraction
powerfully shapes the legal understanding of the ways that creative
practitioners work and the resources that they require.
C.

Abstraction over Materiality

A legal regime meant to promote progress requires a set of premises
about the ways in which progress develops. The reasons for assigning
rights, the specification of rights, and the resolution of particular
disputes all presuppose and reproduce particular understandings of
creative processes and practices.
Here we come to the third
methodological anxiety, which concerns the relative value of abstract
and concrete components of artistic and intellectual culture (and
which relies on an assumption, implicit in this privileging, that the
two can be neatly distinguished). Both rights theorists and economic
theorists articulate a vision of copyright, and of cultural progress,
within which abstraction is prized highly, and in which the most
valuable aspects of artistic and intellectual culture are those that are
most amenable to abstraction. What I want to describe here is a
process analogous to what Katherine Hayles characterizes as the
"platonic backhand," which "constitute[sl the abstraction as the
originary form from which the world's multiplicity derives," followed
by the "platonic forehand," which derives from the foundational
abstraction "a multiplicity sufficiently complex that it can be seen as a
world of its own."41 Building from its own foundational abstraction,
copyright theory constructs a model of creative practice that obviates
any need to interrogate creative practice more directly.
The foundational abstraction within copyright discourse concerns
the primacy of idea over expression. As every student in the basic
copyright course learns, copyright does not protect "ideas," and that is
because ideas are thought to be the shared raw material of progress.
Ideas, in other words, are what enable subsequent authors to build on
the works of past authors even if the expression in those works is the
subject of exclusive rights. 42
41 N. KATHERINE HAYLES, How WE BECAME POSTHUMAN:
CYBERNETICS, LITERATURE, AND INFORMATICS 12-13 (1999).

42

VIRTUAL BODIES IN

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); Harper &: Row Publishers,

HeinOnline -- 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1170 2006-2007

2007]

Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory

1171

Over time, the idea-expression distinction has come to encode a
theory of cultural transmission that is unique to copyright. Both
copyright scholars and cultural theorists understand cultural texts
(including both conventional literary texts and all other forms of
artistic expression) as performing a cultural transmission function.
Within cultural theory, that function resides in the text itself,
including both "idea" and "expression"; for the most part, indeed,
cultural theory does not draw this distinction at all. Cultural theorists
hold that texts reflect context-dependent meanings rather than
invariant "ideas," and regard text and meaning as both inseparably
intertwined and continually evolving. 43 Within copyright theory,
however, the cultural transmission function performed by artistic and
intellectual works is presumed to reside principally in the "ideas"
conveyed by such works rather than in the particular form of their
expression. Broad agreement as to this basic proposition extends
across the methodological divide. To the extent that both rights
theorists and economic theorists advocate expanded privileges to
copy, they do so by reference to the importance of the free circulation
of ideas. Lockean theorists argue that copying is justified to the extent
required by the proviso that "enough, and as good" remain for others
to use; the idea-expression distinction accomplishes this goal in most,
though not all, cases. 44 Free speech theorists link copyright's goals
directly to participation in the exchange of and deliberation about
ideas. 45 Economic theorists assume that freedom to copy ideas

Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1985); 1 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 2.03(D) (2006).
43 Useful discussions of cultural transmission within literary theory include
INFLUENCE AND INTERTEXTUALITY IN LITERARY HISTORY Oay Clayton &: Eric Rothstein
eds., 1991); MARY ORR, INTERTEXTUALITY: DEBATES AND CONTEXTS (2003); see also
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright, Borrowing, and Unfair Use (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (exploring implications of this view of cultural
transmission for copyright's understanding of appropriate borrowing); Rotstein, supra
note 22 (exploring implications for copyright's understanding of originality and
infringement) .
44 See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1581-83 (discussing Lockean justification for
exclusion of ideas); id. at 1568-72 (discussing justifications for interpreting Lockean
proviso to encompass expression in certain circumstances); Hughes, supra note 2, at
313-19.
45 See Netanel, Global Arena, supra note 2, at 272-76; Netanel, Democratic Civil
Society, supra note 2 at 347-64; Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and
Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 975-77 &: 976 n.240 (1999)
(arguing that idea-expression distinction is essential tool for enabling social dialogue).
See generally Michael D. Birnhack, More or Better?: Shaping the Public Domain, in THE
FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 59 (Lucie Guibault &: P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006).
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mInImizes the "deadweight loss" that results from recognizing
exclusive rights in expressive works. 46 In particular, economic
theorists can reconcile price discrimination with expressive
competition only by relying on the free circulation of ideas as the
principal vehicle for cultural transmission. 47
If ideas are the basic units of cultural transmission, disputes about
copyright scope become disputes about identifying those expressions
that should be treated "like" ideas. The "substantial similarity" test for
infringement adopts precisely this approach, separating protected from
unprotected attributes based on their place within a "series of
abstractions. "48 The doctrines of merger and scenes a faire, which
explicitly permit copying of some expression, are justified in the same
terms: they identify situations in which copying must be permitted to
the extent necessary to enable the exchange of ideas. 49 In cases
involving musical compositions and visual works, the abstractionsbased approach creates special difficulties for judges and juries
unaccustomed to parsing nonverbal expression in these terms. Judges
sometimes resolve these difficulties by decreeing either infringement

For a representative discussion, see LANDES &: POSNER, supra note 3, at 90-97.
The economic account of price discrimination in oligopoly markets links price
discrimination to product differentiation, which in tum is a function of differentiation
in expression. For a good explanation, see Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price
Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 82-83 (2001). In conSidering whether price
discrimination will impede or foster the creation of new works, economic theorists
generally ask how the ability to price discriminate will affect price discriminators'
incentives to produce works and whether it will result in optimal diffusion of those
works. See id. at 94-102 (discussing disagreement on those questions). The presumed
separation between (differentiated) expression and underlying idea eliminates any
need to ask about the effects on others' abilities to create. But see Wagner, supra note
3, at 1027 (arguing that because new expression always generates more ideas, granting
tighter exclusive control over expression will generate even more ideas).
48 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) ("Upon
any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last
may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about,'
and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of
abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could
prevent the use of his 'ideas,' to which, apart from their expression, his property is
never extended.").
49 See, e.g., Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 35-37 (1st
Cir. 2001) (applying merger doctrine); Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 589 (2d
Cir. 1996) (applying scenes afaire doctrine); 13 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[B][3],
at 13-79 (2006) (discussing merger doctrine); id. §13.03(B)(4), at 13-85 (discussing
scenes a faire doctrine).
.
46

47
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or noninfringement on an "I know it when I see it" basis. 50 What
juries do is anyone's guess. In other cases, most notably those
involving computer software and databases, the term "idea" also
encodes a second process of abstraction. As used in copyright case
law, and within copyright theory, that term denotes not only ideas per
se, but also facts, processes, procedures, and methods of operation.
Many of these entities are substantially less amenable to abstraction; in
particular, procedures and methods of operation expressed in
computer microcode and judgments about utility expressed in
databases are very difficult to separate from their concrete
instantiations. Calling these things "ideas" makes their concreteness
easier to overlook; conversely, emphasizing their concreteness makes
it easier to claim that they are not "ideas."51 One might think that the
cumulative weight of these difficulties would cast doubt on the
"abstractions" heuristic.
Rather than provoking a general
reexamination of the notion that ideas have a separate existence,
however, each of these analytical processes cements the privileged
status accorded to abstraction.
Identification of "expression" divorced from animating "ideas" as
the appropriate subject of ownership leads to another process of
abstraction, which identifies the "work" as the locus in which rights
reside. 52 This process of abstraction generates broad rights that negate
50 Compare, e.g., Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 271-76 (2d Cir. 2001)
(finding infringement because of similarity in "total concept and feel"), with, e.g.,
Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 810-12 (9th Cir. 2003) (declining to find infringement
because only ideas and standard features were copied), and Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry
Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (declining to find infringement
because idea of jeweled bee pin merged with its expression).
51 Compare, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708 (2d
Cir. 1992) ("[TJhe more efficient a set of modules are, the more closely they
approximate the idea or process embodied in that particular aspect of the program's
structure."), with, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203,21719 (D. Mass. 1992) (holding that particular arrangement of commands in spreadsheet
menu was expression of idea of spreadsheet menu), rev'd, 49 F.3d 807, 816-17 (lst
Cir. 1995) (holding that arrangement of commands in spreadsheet menu was
analogous to "method for operating a VCR" and that '''methods of operation' are not
limited to mere abstractions"); Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1373 (lOth
Cir. 1997) (criticizing Lotus on ground that" [17 U.s.c. §J 102(b) does not extinguish
the protection accorded a particular expression of an idea merely because that
expression is embodied in a method of operation at a higher level of abstraction"), and
Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 1997)
(holding that arrangement of items in taxonomy of dental procedures was
copyrightable expression because it expressed particular judgments about
classification) .
52 On this point I am indebted to Funmi Arewa, whose description of copyrights
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defenses based on the transposition of expression into different forms.
Thus it makes sense to conclude, for example, that the copyrightable
expression in a film inheres in its characters in addition to the
particular actions scripted for them, or that the copyrightable
expression in a television show encompasses the fact that lines of
dialogue were uttered in addition to the rendering of the dialogue in
the context of the show. 53 The initial form of creative expression
becomes merely an exemplar; even expression is abstracted from itself.
Concrete instantiations of works figure in this analysis primarily as
sites of control; the law can focus on regulating the preparation and
distribution of copies or the physical rendering of works as
performances without worrying much about the form of the copying
or the circumstances of the performance. Abstraction thus leads,
paradoxically, toward ever more complete control of things
embodying works. 54 At the same time, the concept of the "work"
systematically excludes forms of expression that do not fit the
definition. 55
The final move in this series of abstractions relates to expression
that is unowned. This content is said to be "in the public domain." In

as involving "two levels of intangibility" inspired me to think more carefully about the
role of abstraction in copyright analysis. See Arewa, supra note 43, at 20; see also
Rotstein, supra note 22 (criticizing construct of fixed, autonomous work).
53 See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm't v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding that trivia guide to Seinfeld television show infringed show's
copyright); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287,
1293 (CD. Cal. 1995) (holding that daredevil character in Honda commercial
infringed copyright in "the James Bond character as expressed and delineated in
Plaintiffs sixteen films" (emphasis omitted»; New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertelsman
Music Group, 693 F. Supp. 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that music video featuring
scary character with burned face, gloved hand with protruding razors, and raspy voice
likely infringed copyright in Freddy character from Nightmare on Elm Street film
series).
54 For an extended discussion of this point, see Julie E. Cohen, Overcoming
Property: Does Copyright Trump Privacy?, 2002 U. ILL.].L. TECH. &: POL'y 375, 378-79.
55 See Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1253-56 (CD. Cal. 2002)
(holding that copyrightable expression in musical composition consisted only of its
notes and did not include scripted performance elements that author claimed as
expressive), aftd on other grounds, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004), cat. denied, 545
U.s. 1114 (2005). See generally Anne Barron, Copyright Law and the Claims of Art,
2002 INTELL. PROP. Q. 368; Anne Barron, Copyright Law's Musical Work, 15 Soc. &:
LEGAL STUD. 101 (2006); Anne Barron, Introduction: Harmony or Dissonance?
Copyright Concepts and Musical Practice, 15 Soc. &: LEGAL STUD. 25 (2006); Anne
Barron, The Legal Properties of Film, 67 MOD. L. REV. 177 (2004); Margaret Chon, New
Wine Bursting from Old Bottles:
Collaborative Internet Art, Joint Works, and
Entrepreneurship, 75 OR. L. REV. 257 (1996).
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recent years, the public domain has become the object of scholarly
attention in its own right, but most of this effort has been devoted to
determining what is in it. 56 Surprisingly little scholarly effort has been
devoted to determining where the public domain is. It may perhaps
be objected that I am being overliteral here; the public domain is a
metaphor and is universally understood as such. But that objection
proves too much. The public domain is a metaphor for the public's
dominion, and dominion without access is a very odd sort of
dominion indeed. As metaphorically constituted, the public domain is
a topological impossibility: a legally constructed space to which
everyone is presumed to have access. Reification of this space enables
copyright jurisprudence to avoid coming to grips with the need for
affirmative rights of access to unowned expression within the spaces
where people actually live.
Here again, the commitment to abstraction derives from core tenets
of liberal political philosophy. The liberal rationalist tradition is
founded on the primacy of the autonomous, disembodied self and the
possibility of transcendent knowledge.
Within this vision, the
concrete forms of cultural artifacts and practices do not matter very
much, nor do the spaces within which cultural practices occur. The
abstractions-based model of cultural production therefore is a critical
conceptual underpinning of the "romantic author" model that so
many copyright scholars have criticized, but it also produces broader
and more systemic effects that the critique of romantic authorship
does not capture. 57
The abstractions-based model of cultural
production tends to marginalize more concrete questions about how
people use culture and produce knowledge, about the conditions that
lead to creative experimentaLion, and about the conditions that
predispose audiences to welcome such experimentation. The result is
56 See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354,360-63 (1£'19). See generally
James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction oj the Public Domain,
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spri:1g 2003, at 33; Lee, supra note 9; Pamela
Samuelson, Challenges in Mapping the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN 7 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, eds., 2006); Pamela Samuelson,
Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 147.
57 Many accomplished scholars argue that the romantic author model is a root
cause of distortions in copyright's understanding of cultural production. See BOYLE,
supra note 23, at 51-60. See generally Arewa, supra note 43; Craig, supra note 36.
Identification of root causes in culture is a tricky business. It is probably most
accurate to say that the liberal rationalist tradition's commitment to abstraction
undergirds the romantic author model, but that the romantic author model also
reinforces the commitment to abstraction.
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a doctrinal framework that obstructs careful examination of creative
processes, and makes grappling with difficult policy choices in
copyright even more difficult than it ought to be.
A wide range of work in social and cultural theory provides
resources with which to interrogate creative processes and practices
more directly. First are a number of disciplines, ranging from
mUSicology to literary theory to art criticism, that study processes of
cultural transmission. Unfettered by copyright's precommitment to
idea over expression, these fields of study have developed extensive
taxonomies of expressive borrowing. 58
Explicit within these
taxonomies is the conclusion that the expression itself is inextricably
bound up with the knowledge transmitted. Second, a diverse group of
diSciplines studies the importance of materiality in social and cultural
practice. Some cultural theorists have focused on the body both as the
inevitable mediator of cultural experience and as a site of social
discipline. 59 Others have explored the social construction of artifacts
and practices. 60 Finally, a rich and vibrant literature addresses
questions of spatiality. Scholars trained in a variety of diSciplines have
explored the ways in which experienced space is shaped, and in which
the resulting social space imposes constraints on the social and
cultural processes that take shape within it. 61 From the perspective of

See generally

GORAN HERMEREN, INFLUENCE IN ART AND LITERATURE (1975); ORR,
note 43; ALLAN H. PASCO, ALLUSION: A LITERARY GRAFT (1994); ]. Peter
Burkholder, The Uses of Existing Music: Musical Borrowing as a Field, 50 NOTES 851
(1994). For application of theories of intertextuality to copyright, see generally
Arewa, supra note 43 (literary criticism); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From].e. Bach to
Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright, and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547
(2006) [hereinafter Arewa, From].e. Bach to Hip HopI (musicology).
58

supra

59 See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 28; HARAWAY, supra note 34, at
149-70; AMELIA JONES, BODY ARTIPERFORMING THE SUBJECT (1998); CAROLYN MARVIN,

WHEN OLD TECHNOLOGIES WERE NEW: THINKING ABOUT ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION
IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY 109-51 (1988); CAROLYN THOMAS DE LA PENA, THE
BODY ELECTRIC: How STRANGE MACHINES BUILT THE MODERN AMERICAN (2003); Martin
Jay, Somaesthetics and Democracy: Dewey and Contemporary Body Art, 36]. AESTHETIC
EDUC. 55 (2002).
60 See
generally BIJKER, supra note 34; THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 34; A SOCIOLOGY OF MONSTERS, supra note 34; cJ.
Michael]. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 381 (2005) (exploring ways in which law participates in and accounts for
construction of objects).
61 See ApPADURAI, supra note 39; FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 28;
STEPHEN GRAHAM &: SIMON MARVIN, SPLINTERING URBANISM:
NETWORKED
INFRASTRUCTURES, TECHNOLOGICAL MOBILITIES AND THE URBAN CONDITION (2001);
DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY (1990); KEVIN HETHERINGTON, THE
BADLANDS OF MODERNITY: HETEROTOPIA AND SOCIAL ORDERING (1997); HENRI LEFEBVRE,
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this scholarly tradition, the concept of a "public domain" in the
abstract means very little.
Understanding the ways in which
preexisting content (including both "public domain" content and
"proprietary" content) shapes creative practice requires careful
consideration of the spatial distribution of cultural resources and
actors.
Engagement with all of these resources is essential to fleshing out a
non-teleological account of the progress that artistic and intellectual
creativity enables, and that copyright is supposed to promote.
Understanding the processes that generate artistic and intellectual
change requires careful attention to the ways in which processes of
cultural production and transmission are mediated by and through
texts, objects, bodies, and spaces. In Part III, I outline the directions
in which such a project might develop.
III.

DECENTERING CREA TlVlTY

How might the insights and resources of social and cultural theory
help to illumine creative processes and practices? Together, they
argue for an account of artistic and intellectual creativity that is
decentered: that incorporates multiple contributing factors and makes
none primary. This account should explore creativity as an emergent
property of social and cultural systems, continually shaped by and
shaping other social changes. 62 Finally, an account of artistic and
intellectual creativity must situate creative practice within the material
and spatial realities that shape and constrain it. Here I will attempt to
develop a preliminary description of creativity that satisfies these
criteria. I will proceed by developing three interlinked accounts. The
first begins with the self and builds outward; it explores "where
creativity comes from" at the individual level. The second begins with
context and builds in; it inquires how the conventions and forms of
artistic and intellectual culture shape creative practice by individuals

THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE (Donald Nicholson trans., 1971); THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF
SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE (Setha M. Low & Denise Lawrence-Zuniga eds.,
2003); SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL
ASSEMBLAGES (2006); ROB SHIELDS, PLACES ON THE MARGIN (1991); EDWARD SOJA,
POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIES: THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY
(1988).
62 On this
point, I am indebted to Michael Madison, whose provocative
observations about the "emergentist" character of creativity inspired me to think more
carefully about the problem of specifying a cultural framework for creativity and about
the elements that such a framework should contain. See Madison, supra note 26, at
1682-86.
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and groups. The third interrogates the boundary conditions between
the individual and the social, with particular regard to the essential
and desirable unpredictability of creative practice. Each of these
accounts is itself preliminary, and is offered as a beginning.
A.

Situated Users

In accounting for creative practice by individuals, it is instructive to
begin with self-reports that stress the ineffable nature of creativity.
There is broad agreement among creative individuals of all types that
creativity is characterized pervasively by a not knowing in advance that
encompasses both inspiration and production. Yet it is possible to be
far more precise both about what is not known and about what is.
Neither creative inputs nor creative outputs are known in advance, but
social and cultural theory tell us a great deal about the processes and
practices of cultural production: about how cultural resources are
encountered and used.
How do individual creators encounter unforeseen inputs, arrive at
unanticipated inspiration, and generate unpredicted and unpredictable
outputs? Here I want to focus on something that may seem, at first, to
be a contradiction in terms: the ubiquity of constraint in the creative
process. I do not mean constraint in the sense of coercion or
limitation, but rather in the se!2se of situatedness within one's own
culture. 63
Situatedness does not refer to a "situation" in the
prescriptive sense (Le., one that might give rise to a legal defense or an
ethical obligation), but more minimally and descriptively to the fact
that individuals and groups are located within particular cultural
contexts. 64 Each situated self encounters path-dependencies that
shape both the content and the material forms of cultural knowledge,
and thus shape creative opportunity. Recognizing situatedness does
not require submerging the individual irretrievably within the social;
creativity has "internal" dimensions as well as "external" ones. But
what is distinct about each individual in relation to the surrounding

63 An earlier version of this argument appears in Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the
User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005).
64 More specifically, I do not mean in this paper to take any particular position
about the relevance of situatedness to moral philosophy. Compare SEYlA BENHABIB,
SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY
ETHICS (1992) (arguing that moral philosophy should recognize that individuals are
situated within bodies, communities, and relational contexts), with DAVID SIMPSON,
SITUATEDNESS, OR WHY WE KEEP SAYING WHERE WE'RE COMING FROM (2002) (arguing
that "the situation" is too readily invoked as substitute for efforts at understanding
others and as excuse for avoiding moral responsibility).
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culture will include differences in situation and the different pathdependencies that result. 65
Because everyone is a user of artistic and cultural goods first and a
creator second (if at all), an account of creativity constrained by
situatedness must begin with users. Elsewhere I have argued that
situated users of copyrighted works appropriate preexisting cultural
goods for four primary purposes. 66 First, they consume cultural
products, including both those that they deliberately seek out and
those that they serendipitously encounter or are motivated to try for
some other reason. Second, situated users appropriate cultural goods
in order to communicate with one another. Third, situated users
appropriate cultural goods for purposes of self-development, and such
goods shape both intellectual and hedonic tastes. Finally, situated
users appropriate cultural goods for purposes of creative play.
There are two important points to appreciate about these activities
by situated users, which together frame a model of cultural
participation that is very different than the one framed by the
conventional dichotomies between author and consumer, author and
imitator, author and improver, and author and critic that pervade the
copyright literature. The first point is that although the activities of
situated users can be listed separately for analytical purposes, in
practice they often cannot be disentangled.
(Here again, then,
abstraction poses an epistemological danger.) Each feeds into the
others in ways that are difficult to identify and impossible to predict.
The second point, which follows from situatedness, is that the
cultural activities of situated users take place within a web of semantic
and material entailments. One cannot simply step out of or around
the resources, values, and absences within her own culture, but must
negotiate one's way through them, following the pathways or "links"
that connect one resource to the next. This process, which I will call
"working through culture," is irreducibly contingent. It moves in
patterns that are both (and sometimes Simultaneously) recursive and
opportunistic, and supports an understanding of creativity as
relational at its core. Carys Craig argues that the model of relational
feminism developed by feminist literary and political theorists enables
reconstruction of "authorship" as a dialogic process consisting of "an
intrapersonal dialogue (developing a form of personal narrative by
drawing upon experience, situation, and critical reflection) and an

65 Cf. DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE, supra note 40, at 20-35 (arguing that art emerges
out of intersections between emergent self and experiences of ordinary life).
66 Cohen, supra note 63, at 370-72.
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interpersonal dialogue (drawing upon the texts and discourses around
her to communicate meaning to an anticipated audience)."67 This
careful, brilliant argument is (as Craig recognizes and as its scholarly
antecedents demand) an argument not only about the nature of
authorship but also and more fundamentally about the nature of the
interaction between emergent self and evolving culture; it is an
account of "where creativity comes from" that locates creativity in the
process of working through culture alongside others who are always
already similarly engaged. 68
The process of working through culture is closely tied not only to
semantic links between content but also to the spatial distribution and
material forms of cultural resources. As already noted, copyright
theorists have tended to offer accounts of creative processes that are
highly abstract, and seem to presume access to extant cultural
resources regardless of their location in space and time.
For
individuals situated in the real world, questions of access are
inextricably bound up with the real-world distribution of artistic and
cultural resources. Those resources are distributed spatially in ways
that make any particular resource more or less proximate, and
therefore more or less relevant, to any given individual. This spatially
distributed set of cultural resources, which I have characterized as the
"cultural landscape," is neither geographically discrete nor composed
entirely of resources that are publicly owned; therefore, it does not
map neatly to the legal category of public domain expression. 69 It is
defined, instead, by the ways in which artistic and intellectual goods
are accessible to individuals in the spaces where they live, and by the
forms of interaction with preexisting expression that are possible and
permitted. The cultural landscape is what supplies the elements in
culture that are experienced as common, regardless of their ownership
status. Working through culture is a process of working through the
cultural landscape. The distributed spatiality of cultural institutions
and artifacts shapes the progression from not knowing to creative
inspiration to creative production.
Working through culture also involves physical interactions among
embodied users, and between embodied users and material artifacts.

67

See Craig, supra note 36 (manuscript at Part IV, on file with author).

Cj.

MICHAEL DUNNE, INTERTEXTUAL ENCOUNTERS IN AMERICAN FICTION, FILM, AND
POPULAR CULTURE 180 (2001) ("[N]oticing more and more intertexts is pretty much
what acculturation is all about.").
69 Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture:
Locating the Public
Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 121, 157-60 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt
Hugenholtz eds., 2006).
68
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In her influential study of the early history of "electric
communication," Carolyn Marvin documented the ways in which
nineteenth century Americans and Europeans used their bodies to
explore the powers and limits of new technologies. 7o Accounts of
artistic creativity within copyright law tend to ignore the ways in
which culture is Similarly apprehended, assimilated, and performed
through the body. Copyright scholars may be uniquely predisposed to
overlook the importance of embodiedness and materiality because for
most of us, the preferred medium of expression is text and the coin of
reputation is the idea. The body's role in mediating consumption of
artistic and intellectual goods is more evident in the performing and
visual arts, for which both academic and lay reviewers alike emphasize
attributes such as rhythm and flow. But embodiedness also informs
the experience of literary texts. Textual works were initially recited
rather than read,71 and many byproducts of orality have persisted in
the print era, including both enduring conventions such as poetic
meter and avant garde literary expressions that self-consciously
disregard established narrative conventions in favor of other, more
discursive rhythms. Networked, hypertext-based environments also
are experienced in terms of an embodied spatiality, characterized by
distances, landmarks, and spatial juxtapositions. 72
In many cases, the body plays a central role in the interpretation of
and communication about cultural resources. Singing and moving to
music and repeating lines of dialogue or action sequences from
favorite television shows and movies are all practices that employ the
body as the mediator of cultural experience. As might perhaps be
expected given our occupational preoccupation with dissent,
copyright scholars who have confronted the physicality of interactions
with cultural artifacts have tended to emphasize direct physical
manipulation of artifacts embodying others' expression in the service
of "semiotic disobedience."73 When these behaviors are situated
within the broader context of embodied interaction, however, the
70 See MARVIN, supra note 59, at 109-51; see also DE LA PENA, supra note 59
(arguing that development and naturalization of electric technologies were also
processes of constructing "the modem seW).
71 See M.T. CLANCHY, FROM MEMORY TO WRITTEN RECORD: ENGLAND 1066-1307, at
266-93 (2d ed. 1993).
72 For more extended discussion of this point, see Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace
as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L REV. 210 Oan. 2007).
73 See Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L REV. 489 (2006); see
also Giselle Fahimian, How the IP Guerillas Won: @™ark, Adbusters, Negativland, and
the "Bullying Back" of Creative Freedom and Social Commentary, 2004 STAN. TECH. L
REV. 1 (discussing direct manipulation as form of civil disobedience).
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framework of dissent seems strained. It seems both simpler and more
accurate to recognize that embodied interactions with cultural
resources are ubiquitous and protean. In particular, many processes
of cultural participation occur not via "consumption" in the abstract,
but rather by literally inserting the self into the work, and these
processes can be celebratory as well as critical. It is also worth noting
that many of these activities are fundamentally group-based. A variety
of performance-oriented activities, ranging from children's music
recitals to karaoke to community theater, position groups gathered in
physical space as important mediators of cultural knowledge.
Physical engagement with works and artifacts and direct
appropriation of texts remain important as consumption and
communication shade into self-constitution and creative play. In the
visual and performing arts, the body becomes an indispensable tool for
accessing and mastering prevailing creative conventions; imitation of
the "masters" perfects technique and inscribes glossaries of form.74 As
artistic techniques mature, imitation becomes dialogue, and modes of
reworking become more complex, but reworking remains central. 7S
Regardless of artistic field or genre, creative outputs do not simply
spring full-blown from the minds of their creators, but are arrived at
through processes that are iterative, experimental, and hands-on. In
literature and film, intergenerational dialogue manifests through the
reworking of texts, including not only plots and characters but also all
other forms, tropes, and conventions. 76 Francesca Coppa argues that
textual reworkings by mass media fans, which focus on plot and
character, are forms of dramatic storytelling that reflect embodiedness,
"relying on the audience's shared extra textual knowledge of sets and
wardrobes, of the actors' bodies and their smiles and movements ... to
direct a living theatre in the mind."77 Some cultural practices such as
musical sampling, jazz improvisation, appropriation art, and fan
74 See generally CORNELIA J. HOMBURG, THE COpy TURNS ORIGINAL (1996)
(describing central role of copying in artistic training and development).
75 See Burkholder, supra note 58, at 855 ("[AJ historical development became
apparent in Ives's methods of using existing music, leading from simple,
commonplace types of borrowing such as modeling, settings, and variations to the
more complex and individual types of his middle and later periods, such as
cumulative setting, patchwork, and collage."). See generally MIEKE BAL, QUOTING
CARAVAGGIO: CONTEMPORARY ART, PREPOSTEROUS HISTORY (1999).
76 See ORR, supra note 43, at 170-74. See generally HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF
INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY (2d ed. 1997).
77 Francesca Coppa, Writing Bodies in Space:
Media Fan Fiction as Theatrical
Perfonnance, in FAN FICTION AND FAN COMMUNITIES IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET: NEW
ESSAYS 225, 243 (Karen Hellekson & Kristina Busse eds., 2006).
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fiction more directly foreground reworking.
As Richard Schur
describes, these are practices that invert the traditional abstractionbased hierarchy of copyright law entirely. Within these forms of
cultural expression, the relation between idea and expression is not
"one idea, many expressions" but rather "one expression, many
ideas."78 The key point to appreciate, however, and one that is often
lost in discussions celebrating the "oppositionality" of "appropriation
art," is that these modern variants are not fundamentally different
from older forms of creative practice. Across the spectrum of creative
practice, manipulation of preexisting texts, objects, and techniques
figures centrally in processes of cultural participation.
If we return to the point from which this section began - to the not
knOWing that creative individuals self-report to be an indispensable
element of the creative process - we see that the unknown emerges
from interactions with the known via practices of juxtaposition,
iteration, dialogue, and experimentation that are both conceptual and
physical, and that cannot be understood as the manipulation of
abstract ideas to generate linear progress. Nor can they be understood
as entirely purposive. Individual creators begin with situatedness and
work through culture to arrive at the unexpected. Copyright scholars
should be concerned with all aspects of this process, which furnishes
the means for creative expression to come into being.
B.

Networks of Knowledge, Networks of Practice

Looking at creativity in systemic perspective raises additional
From a systemic
questions for copyright scholars to consider.
perspective, artistic and ir:~ellectual culture is most usefully
understood not as a set of products, but rather as a set of
interconnected, relational networks of actors, resources, and emergent
creative practices. Within these networks, creative practice is shaped
by all that is culture, including the demands and conventions of
knowledge communities and the conventions that crystallize around
particular artifacts, places, technologies, and materials. It is shaped, as
well, by contests over prevailing conventions that arise both within
and across cultural boundaries.
The points that I want to make here are informed substantially by
methodologies in postmodernist critical theory and STS that are
themselves contested. The strand of postmodernist critical theory
known as deconstructionism and the strand of STS scholarship known
78 Richard Schur, Parodies of Ownership:
Hip Hop Aesthetics and Intellectual
Property Law 38-39 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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as strict constructivist theory of technology ("SCOT") hold that texts
and technologies have no fixed meanings, but rather take on meanings
ascribed by their readers and users.79 These theories in turn have
engendered two powerful critiques. First, both deconstructionism and
SCOT have been criticized for ascribing a version of autonomy to
human-generated artifacts. Second and more seriously, they have
been criticized for rendering meaningful discussion about larger social
and cultural processes impossible. The second critique in particular is
compelling for its sheer entertainment value; at times the aversion to
fixity within these scholarly literatures smacks of self-parody. It is
tempting to conclude that the medium is the message. I think,
though, that this is a mistake, and that legal scholars (or at least
copyright scholars) have made the further mistake of being too
inclined to assume that these sub-strands stand for their diSciplines
more generally.
I want to argue, instead, that the methodologies of critical theory
and STS are most usefully understood as offering points of entry from
which to explore the creation of meaning within complex cultural
systems. Here the autonomy critique is a red herring; a central tenet
of both critical theory and STS is that texts and technologies, and the
social practices that cohere around them, are sites of evolving and
contested meaning. The STS literature in particular emphasizes that a
"technology" is in fact a heterogeneous assemblage of elements that
together shape the particularities of its form and use. so Over time,
these assemblages can shift in response to changing practices,
discourses, and institutional alignments. I want to suggest that this
approach has potentially fruitful applications to the arts and
intellectual pursuits that are the traditional subject matter of
copyright, which emerge out of the day-to-day realities of creative
practice.
If creative practice is a heterogeneous assemblage of knowledge,
materials, and institutions, what are its constituent elements? With
79 A useful introduction to SCOT is Philip Brey, Social Constructivism for
Philosophers of Technology: A Shopper's Guide, TECHNE, Spring/Summer 1997, at 56.
On deconstructionism and the meanings of texts, see generally JACQUES DERRIDA, OF
GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., 1976); Jack M. Balkin,
Deconstruction's Legal Career, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 719 (2005) (describing
deconstructive techniques and their problematic relation to questions of social
justice).
80 For examples of this approach, see generally BUKER, supra note 34; A SOCIOLOGY
OF MONSTERS, supra note 34; John Law, Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering:
The Case of Portuguese Expansion, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL
SYSTEMS, supra note 34, at 111.
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respect to the accumulated knowledge that animates creative practice,
the Kuhnian approach to the development of scientific knowledge
suggests a multi-part model of creativity. Studies of artistic culture
suggest a process of iteration within established conventions
punctuated by larger "representational shifts" that loosely parallels
Kuhn's distinction between "normal science" and "paradigm shifts" in
scientific and technical understanding. 8l In "normal science" mode,
creative practice is more strongly constrained by existing institutions.
At moments of representational shift, this is less true.
Representational shifts in artistic practice do not inevitably disrupt
artistic understanding the way paradigm shifts in science do, because
artistic practice does not require the same sort of grounding in fact
that scientific practice does. In artistic and intellectual culture,
different ways of seeing, hearing, and thinking the world can more
easily coexist. OccaSionally, however, representational shifts can
inaugurate powerful social narratives that are more closely equivalent
to paradigm shifts. A good example of the latter is Adam Smith's
"invisible hand," which fundamentally changed the way Western
civilization understood economics by endowing the market with an
independent, metaphorically embodied existence.
Processes of artistic and intellectual production are mediated by
validating institutions, which propagate the established conventions of
normal science and serve as the first line of reception for (or defense
against) representational shifts. Networks of cultural production
create "fields" and "domains" of expertise. 82 To an extent the
demarcation of fields and domains is created and maintained by the
entities that traditionally have been the concerns of sociology: the
communities and institutions that make up "art worlds.,,83 Established
tastemaking institutions within art worlds play important roles in
determining the fate of innovations, although new validating
institutions will sometimes emerge. The Foucauldian approach to
knowledge formation suggests, however, that the processes of
demarcation and definition extend beyond particular institutions
(museums, composers, literary critics, universities) to encompass
more widely shared discursive conventions (such as ideas of
authorship or distinctions between "pornography" and "art"). Both
the Foucauldian approach and the Frankfurt School approach to
81

An earlier iteration of this argument appears in Cohen,

supra note 69, at 149-

50.
82 See
BOURDlEU, CULTURAL PRODUCTION,
CSlKSZENTMlHALYI, supra note 40, at 36-45; GARDNER,
83 See generally BECKER, supra note 37.

supra note 28, at
supra note 4, at 34-40.
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cultural production also direct our attention to a wider and more
heterogenous assortment of validating institutions. In particular,
capitalist models of cultural production and distribution exert
enormous influence on the form and content of creative expression.
Corporate employers in the "creative industries," corporate channels
of media distribution, and providers of advertising all shape tastes and
conventions in a variety of ways.84 Creative practice contests all of
these processes but is also, and importantly, molded by them in
matters of both form and substance. Creative practice also sits at the
intersection of struggles between elite and corporate tastemakers over
the division of cultural authority, which in turn affect prevailing
interpretations of what counts as normal science, and for whom. 85
Understanding creative processes and practices as sites of
contestation with and among validating institutions also highlights the
importance of more impressionistic modes of knowledge production.
Bruno Latour has shown that narrative plays a central role in the social
production of scientific knowledge.
For example, his study of
pasteurization describes a process of discursive construction that
generated anthropomorphizing narratives about the microbes targeted
by pasteurization; those narratives in turn shaped the public response
to the new technology.86 Discursive constructions play equally

84 See generally DIANA CRANE, THE PRODUCTION OF CULTURE: MEDIA AND THE URBAN
ARTS (1992) (adapting and extending Becker's model to accommodate mass culture).
Copyright scholars have recognized aspects of this shaping, but have tended to focus
more closely on aspects amenable to economic analysis or free speech analysis. See,
e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311 (1997);
Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information Production, 22
INT'L REV. L. &: ECON. 81 (2002); Netanel, Democratic Civil SOciety, supra note 2, at
360-61; Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, supra note 3.
Some argue that capitalist intennediation of media content is no longer necessary
for the production of a vibrant mass culture. See, e.g., Dan Hunter &: F. Gregory
Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. &: MARY L. REV. 951 (2004). That may be
right, but a cultural analysis of copyright cannot consider only what is possible. It
must take into account the cultural path-dependencies that presently exist.
85 For helpful discussions of the relationships between elite and popular
tastemakers, see generally HERBERT GANS, POPULAR CULTURE AND HIGH CULTURE: AN
ANALYSIS &: EVALUATION OF TASTE (1999); LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, HIGHBROwlLoWBROW:
THE EMERGENCE OF CULTURAL HIERARCHY IN AMERICA (1988).
For a range of
perspectives on one recent controversy, see Colette Bancroft, The Gray Divide Between
Popular and Literary, ST. PETERSBURG TiMES, Jan. 24, 2004, at IE; Harold Bloom, For
the World of Letters, It's a Horror, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2003, at B13; Saul Rosenberg, In
Praise of Ambiguity, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 5, 2003, at 27; Stephen King, Acceptance
Speech
at
the
2003
National
Book
Awards
(2003),
available
at
http://www.nationalbook.orglnbaacceptspeech_sking.html.
86 See LATOUR, supra note 34, at 59-110.
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important roles in shaping prevailing understandings of art, beauty,
and intellectual merit. For example, the debate at the turn of the
twentieth century about whether photography was an art form or a
merely "technical" endeavor required the generation and embrace of
new narratives about art and authorship.87 Copyright scholars have
long recognized that discourses about art play a role in shaping
copyright law. For example, Justice Holmes, who authored the
Supreme Court's opinion recognizing copyrightable originality in
circus posters, was an art collector steeped in contemporary discourses
of art appreciation, and used his majority opinion for the Court to
translate those discourses for a wider audience. 88 At the same time, as
Anne Barron has shown, copyright does not simply respond to trends
in aesthetic theory; discourses within copyright also shape
understandings of art. 89
In addition, understanding creative processes and practices as sites
of contestation raises questions about the effects of cultural boundarycrossings on the production of artistic and intellectual knowledge. In
this section, I have used the term "networks" not to suggest that the
study of culture is reducible to the study of network science, but
instead to denote sets of interactions that are Simultaneously fluid and
constrained, and that lack fixed, distinct borders of their own.
Networks of artistic and intellectual resources are, of course, both
situated within and constitutive of culture more broadly, but these
networks also can overlap other sorts of cultural boundaries, and
indeed the opportunism that characterizes "working through culture"
makes some such overlaps inevitable. Those boundary-crossings, in
turn, may provoke struggles over every aspect of creative practice.
Too often, copyright law becomes embroiled in such struggles without
appreciating their wider cultural Significance. As Richard Schur's
detailed study of copyright's response to the hip hop aesthetic of

87 See Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright's Response to the
Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L REV. 385, 416-32 (2004).
88 See
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The Story of Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Company:
Originality as a Vehicle for Copyright Inclusivity, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 77, 94-99 Oane C. Ginsburg &: Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss eds., 2006); cj. Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S.
CAL L REV. 247, 266-97 (1998) (arguing that different judicial interpretations of
copyright doctrine reflect implicit differences in approaches to aesthetics).
89 For Anne Barron's work, see sources cited supra note 55.
Cj. Michael J
Madison, Comment: Where Does Creativity Come From? And Other Stories of Copyright,
53 CASE W. RES. L REV. 747, 759-62 (2003) (arguing that copyright law both relies on
and reproduces origin stories of creativity).
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signification explores, the result may be a hardening of the cultural
boundaries written into law. 90
Here a word about the role of social groups is in order. Social
groups playa dual role in creative processes, functioning both as users
and as immediate cultural environments for individual users. Groups
mediate between their own members and wider social and cultural
networks more or less tightly. Within copyright law, the relative
salience assigned to contributions of individuals and contributions of
groups affects the designation of authorship. The points that I want to
make here, however, are not about the legal assignment of authorship,
but about the effects of group mediation on the substance of creative
As anyone who has ever co-authored a paper or
"progress."
collaborated on an art project will appreciate, concrete suggestions
always originate with particular individuals, but the group dynamic
determines the project's overall path. This is true (in varying degrees)
of all projects, not just those designated as group projects. 9!
Social groups also can consciously seek to channel creative practice
in a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons. Along with validating
institutions, social groups play important roles in determining both
conceptions of artistic and intellectual merit and conceptions of the
appropriate social domains of creative practice. Moreover, social
groups and validating institutions may be interrelated in complex
ways. In the case of indigenous or so-called "traditional" cultures,
validating institution and social group are closely linked, so that
conceptions of merit are closely bound up with perceptions of cultural
identity. As Madhavi Sunder has described, in these circumstances
contests over cultural authority can become contests over the meaning
of cultural membership.92 In other cases, as the example of hip hop
illustrates,
the
relationship
between
social
groups
and
(traditional/majority) validating institutions may be more nearly
disjunctive, and the contest itself may become a defining condition of
cultural identity.93 In many other cultural settings, however, the
relationships between social groups and validating institutions are less
binary.
Some social groups may exercise influence that runs
orthogonally to that exercised by validating institutions, and
individuals may belong to multiple groups. In these cases the

90
9l

92
93

See Schur, supra note 78, at ch. 5.
See GARDNER, supra note 4, at 43-44; SIMONTON, supra note 40, at 206-15.
See Sunder, Identity Politics, supra note 39, at 71-73, 91-94.
See Arewa, From].C. Bach to Hip Hop, supra note 58, at 579-86.
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relations between identity and forms of cultural expression are more
fluid, and contests over cultural authority less consuming.
Finally, because creative practice involves physical action by
embodied human beings, it is shaped not only by the patterns of
knowledge and discourse that crystallize around content in the
abstract, but also by the patterns of behavior and discourse that
crystallize around artifacts, raw materials, and social spaces. For
example, the chemical and physical requirements of traditional, filmbased photography emphasize skill in "seeing," capturing, and
printmaking; in digital photography, the potential for manipulation of
the initial image shifts the focus to reenvisioning and altering observed
reality in an infinite number of ways.94 The built environment of the
concert hall, the home stereo system, the personal digital music
player, and the home digital recording studio each encourages some
forms of interaction with music and some techniques of composition
to a greater degree than others. Processes of artistic bricolage are
similarly both conceptual and physical. The genre of "world music"
does not simply combine abstract compositional techniques from
different musical traditions, but also combines disparate rhythms,
instruments, and performance configurations. 95 Judges deciding
copyright disputes over music sampling have wondered why
defendants did not simply make their own recordings of the desired
excerpts, but the practice of sampling derives its meaning as
intracultural dialogue preCisely from using the original recording. 96 In
both of these cases and in countless others, creative practice coalesces
around the expressive resources available within cultural landscapes.
Each of the dynamiCS described above infuses creative processes and
practices with a species of path dependence characterized not by a
rigid determinism but by a more fruitful complexity. To the extent
that cultural artifacts and practices permit a variety of uses and
interpretations, their developmental paths are never wholly within
anyone's control. Both their origins and their continuing relevance are
determined by negotiation and renegotiation within cultural networks.

94

See Michael Kimmelman, Walker Evans. Or Is It?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006, at

E27.
95 See, e.g., CHEIKH Lo, LAMP FALL (World CircuitINonesuch Records 2006);
TINARlWEN, AMASSAKOUL (World Village 2004).
96 See Arewa, From].e. Bach to Hip Hop, supra note 58, at 619-25; Schur, supra
note 78, at 8-l3.
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The Play of Culture

The foregoing discussion suggests, as it is meant to, that creative
practice is substantially determined by cultural context. At the same
time, it is equally clear that creative practice is not fully determined by
cultural context; if it were, creative outputs would be easy to predict
and we could all move on to other problems. The question thus
remains: what, if anything, is it possible to say about all that is
unpredictable in artistic and intellectual expression? What increases
the likelihood that someone will see, hear, or think the world
differently in the first place? A critical ingredient is the "play" that the
networks of culture afford, including not only the extent to which
they permit purposive creative experimentation, but also the extent to
which they enable serendipitous access to cultural resources and
facilitate unexpected juxtapositions of those resources.
Several copyright scholars have challenged the intentionalist
framework that undergirds both rights theories and economic theories
of copyright, arguing that artistic and intellectual innovation flow
from processes of creative play.97 Research in the psychology of
creativity supports this position and suggests that unstructured
freedom to "see what happens" is an important determinant of creative
success. 98 Yet other social science research also suggests that creative
play by situated users, which is at some level still a deliberately chosen
activity, is not the only sort of play that matters. New pathways of
artistic and intellectual exploration are opened partly by other types of
serendipity that are even farther removed from individual control.
Just as fields of study and domains of expertise are important
determinants of creative practice, so disruption and cross-fertilization
between extant fields and domains are important conditions of
creative pOSSibility. In science, some paradigm-shifting theories are
generated by scientists who migrate to one field after being trained in
another. 99 Others, such as Einstein's theory of relativity, appear to
have been stimulated by fortuitous encounters with concrete, practical
problems that previous theoreticians had not considered. 100 In art,
97 See Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant:
Free Software and the Death of
Copyright, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 107, 126-29 (Niva Elkin-Koren
& Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002); Lange, supra note 19, at 148-51; David Lange,
Reimagining the Public Domain, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 463,
482-83.
98 See AMABILE, supra note 40, at 115-20, 231-32; CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 40,
at 120-2l.
99 See SIMONTON, supra note 40, at 123-25 (listing examples).
100 See PETER GAUSON, EINSTEIN'S CLOCKS, POINCARE'S MAPS: EMPIRES OF TiME 221-
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representational shifts often have emerged following serendipitous
encounters with artifacts, techniques, and assumptions originating
within different creative traditions. \01
Scholars who point to the importance of the chance encounter that
yields unexpected fruit are describing both creative play and a
different sort of play altogether. This sort of play, which I have called
the "play of culture," has a distinct phenomenology that is not
intentionalist at all, but rather is most closely analogous to what
Gadamer described as "to and fro.,,102 Play in the Gadamerian sense
denotes a pattern that is neither entirely random nor wholly ordered.
Within the realm of creative practice, the play of culture is the to-andfro in flows of artistic and cultural goods and in cultural practices of
representation. Play in this sense is an essential enabling condition of
cultural progress. 103
If all of this seems too Zen, it is worth noting that physical scientists
recognize a very similar concept. As conventionally used by physical
scientists and engineers, the term "degrees of freedom" refers (in
different ways) to flexibility of motion within a system or structure.
As conventionally used by statisticians, the term refers to the number
of independent variables that affect probability distributions. In each
of these senses, degrees of freedom is said to be a measure of
complexity and uncertainty with respect to the phenomenon sought to
be measured or predicted. It is important to understand, however,
that the term does not thereby eliminate uncertainty and
unpredictability, but simply provides a convention for marking its
presence. (And for that reason, "degrees of freedom" does not equal
63 (2003) (describing Einstein's work in Swiss patent office during period of intense
interest in patents for coordination and synchronization of time).
101 See, e.g., DANIEL BOORSTIN, THE CREATORS:
A HISTORY OF HEROES OF THE
IMAGINATION 384-94 (1993) (describing Brunelleschi's study of classical architecture
prior to his "discovery" of linear perspective); CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 40, at 3234 (same); MARILYN RANDALL, PRAGMATIC PLAGIARISM: AUTHORSHIP, PROFIT, AND POWER
238-40 (2001) (discussing emergence of "African novel"); Paul E. Geller, Hiroshige vs.
Van Gogh: Resolving the Dilemma of Copyright Scope in Remedying Infringement, 46 j.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 39 (1998) (discussing impressionist painters' appropriation of
compositional and stylistiC elements from Hiroshige woodcuts).
102 See HANS-GEORG GAOAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 102-10 Ooel Weinsheimer &
Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 2004); see also Cohen, supra note 63, at 371-73.
103 For arguments in a similar vein, see generally Paul Edward Geller, Must
Copyright Be For Ever Caught Between Marketplace and Authorship Norms?, in OF
AUTHORS AND ORIGINS 159, 192-98 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994)
(relating progress to "sign wealth"); Michael j. Madison, Complexity and Copyright in
Contradiction, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.j. 125, 145-58 (2000) (relating progress to
complexity in aesthetic environment).
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"probability," which quantifies and predicts the behavior of actors or
systems. Although the two concepts are often used in tandem, they
are distinct.)
Together, the play of culture and the processes of creative play that
it sustains are what prevent established ways of seeing, hearing, and
thinking the world from becoming calcified.
Logically and
chronologically antecedent to the creative play performed by
individuals and groups, the play of culture supplies the unexpected
inputs to creative processes, fuels serendipitous consumption by
situated users, and inclines audiences toward the new. The chance
encounters it generates are sources of dissonance, provocation,
meaning, and unexpected beauty. Creative play by situated users
exploits both the practices and conventions within established
networks and the chance connections that the play of culture
provides.
IV.

ENGINEERING CREATIVITY: LAw AND CULTURE

What are the consequences of understanding creative processes in
the way that I have just described? Although the model elaborated in
Part III is (ironically) quite abstract, this approach to theorizing the
creative process has some very direct implications for copyright policy
and doctrine.
Decentering creativity disrupts the tight linkage
between copyright and creativity that has come to dominate public
debate about copyright issues, and that pervades legislative and policy
processes. This, in turn, enables an account of the oft-invoked
"copyright balance" that emphasizes the process of working through
culture and the importance of play within cultural landscapes. This
twofold reframing dictates a very different approach to questions of
optimal copyright scope. At the same time, it underscores the
connections between copyright, cultural progress, and social justice.
Lobbyists for the copyright industries are in the habit of asserting
that copyright is the single most critical prerequisite for a vibrant
artistic and intellectual culture. Some of this is theater driven by
political expediency. No one wants to be against creativity, and if
copyright equals creativity then no one wants to be against copyright.
Yet beneath the rhetoric, both copyright lawyers and copyright
scholars tend to assume that copyright law is centrally important in
stimulating a high level of creativity. Since copyright theory and
jurisprudence persistently devalue the role of context in shaping
culture, that assumption is unsurprising. The tight linkage between
copyright and creativity, however, both fuels romantic author
narratives and justifies draWing firm distinctions between authors, on
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the one hand, and consumers, imitators, and improvers on the other.
Those distinctions dominate the current landscape of copyright law;
they undergird broad rights to control copies, public renderings, and
derivations of copyrighted works and expansive readings of the rules
that create liability for technology providers.
Decentering creativity challenges the widespread assumption about
nature and direction of copyright's influence on creativity in two ways.
First and most obviously, it tends to suggest a much more modest
conception of the role that copyright plays in stimulating creative
processes and practices. Copyright fulfills some important economic
functions (of which more shortly), and therefore plays an important
role in organizing cultural production, but it is hardly ever the direct
cause of a representational shift in creative practice, nor does it appear
to play a direct role in motivating much that is normal science.
Scholars who ask how deplOying copyright might stimulate creativity
(as opposed to production) are asking the wrong question. Neither
creative inspiration nor the creative outputs that follow from it are so
easily engineered.
Questions remain, however, about the extent to which the
contextual factors that are more important in stimulating creativity are
amenable to social engineering. Arguably, the dynamic that I have
described would exist in any social and economic system that is
sufficiently complex. And if creativity is not especially amenable to
social engineering, perhaps both those whose primary concern is
social engineering and those whose primary concern is strong
copyright can simply take it as a given. At the very least, then, one
might posit that strong copyright does no harm. Put differently, if
copyright is not the most important factor in stimulating creativity, it
still may be the most important factor within our control. If copyright
serves other important functions, such as the organization of private
cultural production and the distribution of artistic and intellectual
goods, perhaps strong copyright is good policy.
Here the decentered model of creativity makes its second
contribution: it provides a firmer foundation for arguments about the
systemic harms that a regime of copyright can produce. Critics of
copyright maximalism have long argued that overly rigid control of
access to and manipulation of cultural goods stifles artistic and
cultural innovation, and a growing body of anecdotal evidence
suggests that copyright's "permission culture" does exert a substantial
constraining influence on creative practice. 104 Similarly, research in

1M

See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1282 (lIth Cir.
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the psychology of creativity suggests that attempts to impose a rigid
structure on the creative process quickly become counterproductive,
and that the success of the creative process hinges in part on the
ability to avoid externally imposed distractions. 105 A model of
creativity grounded in the methods of social and cultural theory
supplies both a rigorous analytical underpinning for those arguments
and observations and a discourse in which to frame them. Within this
framework, a regime of copyright that aims to promote cultural
progress must be assessed based on its effects on creative practice by
situated users, and on the extent to which it renders elements of the
cultural landscape more or less accessible.
And within this
framework, those who advocate more limited copyright can be "for"
rather than "against" creativity.
What legal regime, though, does the decentered model of copyright
recommend?
It might be argued that copyright and play are
definitionally incompatible. There is an inevitable tension between
social theorists' emphasis on mobility, emergence, and decentering
and the legal system's need for fixity, clarity, and predictability. Some
theorists from both sides of the law-social science divide have argued
that legal recognition of particular kinds of claims - to specific forms
of cultural property, or to particular formulations of human rights itself works a form of imperialism, in which the law's need for
doctrinal and definitional certainty is inimical to the demands of
emergent social processes. 106 To an important extent, though, this
social science critique of law's possibility ignores its own most
powerful disciplinary inSight: law is not separate from social systems.
As Naomi Mezey has described, the relationship between "law" and
"culture" is an interdependent one characterized by cycles of
2001) (Marcus, ]., concurring) (describing testimony of author Pat Conroy about
restrictions that Margaret Mitchell estate sought to impose on would-be writers of
"official" sequel to Gone with the Wind); PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETERjASZI, UNTOLD
STORIES:
CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR
DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS 29-40 (2004), http://www.centerforsocialmedia.orglrockl
indexlhtm. See generally MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE?
FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL (2005); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE
CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAw TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); Illegal Art, Freedom of Expression in the Corporate
Agency, http://www.illegal-art.orgl (last visited Feb. 9, 2007).
105 See AMABILE, supra note 40, at 115-20, 231-32; CSIKSZENTMlHALYl, supra note 40,
at 120-2l.
106 See MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? 209-27 (2003); Alexander
A. Bauer, Definitional Anxieties, ANTHROPOLOGY NEWS, Dec. 2005, at 27; Annelise Riles,
Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage, AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST, Mar. 2006, at 52.
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definition, slippage, and redefinition. 107 Within this general pattern,
law and culture evolve together; the fixity that law imposes within
culture is a matter of degree and may be a defensible means of
pursuing other social goals that are themselves evolving.
In designing a good system of copyright, then, we also must
consider the other social goals that a system of copyright serves. Here
economic theorists' emphasis on the production and distribution of
cultural goods becomes important and can be restated more
accurately: copyright is a means of creating economic fixity, and thus
predictability, in the organization of cultural production. Control of
copying, manipulation, and derivation enables the organization of
entire sectors of economic activity in ways that produce a variety of
concrete benefits, ranging from jobs and exports to an independent
expressive sector to cultural "solidarity goods."108 Those are desirable
goods; a society characterized by complete lack of economic certainty
would be unstable, state control of cultural production would be
undesirable, and a culture without shared expressive referents would
be far less enjoyable. But these arguments too have been pushed to
extremes in the copyright wars. Lobbyists for the copyright industries
argue thin because copyright enables economic and cultural
productivity, truncating copyright entitlements would be disastrous
not only for their employers, but also for the country more
generally. 109 Neither conclusion follows. In the real world, which is
the world that creative communities have always inhabited, play and
economic stability are not mutually exclusive. Shared expressive
referents predate mass culture, and mass culture benefits from "an
interdependence, even a circulation, between mass and popular
culture. Popular culture makes use of the mass cultural resources that
capitalism provides, and mass culture often co-opts and markets pop
cultural practices." 110 And it is well recognized that economic fixity is
not an unmitigated good.

See Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALEj.L. &: HUMAN. 35, 57-66 (200l).
See Netanel, Democratic Civil Society, supra note 2, at 352-62; see also Guy
Pessach, Copyright Law as a Silencing Restriction on Noninfringing Materials: Unveiling
the Scope of Copyright's Diversity Externalities, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1083-91 (2003)
107

108

(highlighting importance of solidarity goods but arguing that mass commercial culture
exerts undesirable influence on content of such goods). See generally TYLER COWEN,
IN PRAISE OF COMMERCIAL CULTURE (1998).
109 See also Hughes, supra note 45, at 926 (arguing that audiences for copyrighted
works benefit from cultural stability).
110 Naomi Mezey &: Mark C. Niles, Screening the Law:
Ideology and Law in
American Popular Culture, 28 COLUM.j.L. &: ARTS 91, 99 (2005).
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It is therefore correct to say that copyright requires a balancing act,
but the decentered model of creativity prompts us to redescribe what
copyright balances. What is required is not a balance between present
authors and the abstract "public," nor between valuable entitlement
and ephemeral "deadweight loss," both formulations that encourage
would-be balancers to equate relative concreteness with relative
importance. Balance also does not refer merely to a process by which
the claims of competing interest groups are aired en route to striking a
deal. As Robert Burrell and Allison Coleman have trenchantly
observed, references to balancing in copyright rhetoric contain a
"semantic ambiguity" that results in slippage between notions of
balance as process and notions of balance as correct result. III The
notion of balance that I mean to invoke is substantive, and concerns
the ways in which copyright's goal of creating economic fixity must
accommodate its mission to foster cultural play.
Economic analysis can help us to understand some of the
considerations relevant to the balance between economic fixity and
cultural mobility, but both valuation and incommensurability
problems prevent a comprehensive summing of the relevant costs and
benefits. Modeling the benefits of artistic and intellectual flux is hard
to do, and comparing those benefits with the more tangible,
predictable gains from existing models of creative production is even
harder. The emphasis on creative destruction now popular among
copyright scholars invokes an historical theory, not an economic
As Karl Polanyi reminded us, moreover, creative
theorem. 112
destruction is nicest for those who do not have to undergo it. ll3 It is
hardly surprising, then, that economic theorists cannot agree on how
to model the optimal regime for promoting "improvements." No one
is against creativity, but that apparent unanimity conceals rather large
disagreements about how wholeheartedly and unreservedly we are for
it. Modeling the opportunity costs of cultural fixity is equally difficult.
Although we can say with some confidence that costs affect individual
behavior, it is hard to know the cumulative effect of those costs on

III See ROBERT BURRELL &: ALLISON COLEMAN, COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS: THE DIGITAL
IMPACT 188-91 (2005).
112 See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster
and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 294-311 (2002)
(arguing that copyright is not needed to induce either creation or distribution in
digital age). See generally JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCtALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
81-86 (1950) (coining term and explaining its significance).
113 See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OF OUR TiME 37-42, 77-102 (1944).
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unknown future behavior. To the extent that economic modeling
focuses on what is known (or assumed) about benefits and costs,
moreover, it tends to crowd out the unknown and unpredictable, with
the result that play remains a peripheral consideration when it should
be central.
To grapple with these problems, a larger toolkit and a different
attitude toward social engineering are required. Methodologically, the
distinction I am trying to draw is one between a social theory of
creativity that embraces an eclectic range of methods, including
economic methods, and an economic model of creativity that has
room only for its own methods, and that consequently distorts in
predictable and predictably damaging ways.
Substantively, the
distinction is one between deploying known cost-benefit calculations
in an attempt to generate predictable results and deliberately leaving
room for unpredictable results to emerge.
Creativity requires
breathing room, and thrives on play in the system of culture. This
suggests powerfully that copyright entitlements should be narrow and
clearly incomplete, and that the scope for individual experimentation
should be generous. It suggests, as well, that courts deciding
infringement cases should not attempt to close gaps in the structure of
copyright out of misplaced sympathy to current rightholders, but
instead should exercise self-restraint.
Rights theories, meanwhile, can help us to articulate some of the
aspirations that a good regime of copyright should promote, but
furthering those aspirations requires moving beyond abstract ideals to
concrete guarantees. Yochai Benkler powerfully advances the cause of
a robust vision of liberal humanism that "is concerned first and
foremost with the claims of human beings as human beings."1l4
Within that vision, it makes sense to talk about liberal ideals of
autonomy and self-determination and to understand those ideals as
bound up with a larger commitment to human flourishing. But a
commitment to human flourishing also requires more direct
engagement with the patterns of cultural progress and with the
material and spatial realities of cultural processes. Autonomy is
exercised, and self-determination pursued, by working through
culture. Laws granting rights in artistic and intellectual expression
should be deSigned with that process in mind. And, as Madhavi
Sunder reminds us, culture is not an obstacle that must be
transcended en route to self-determination, but a medium of self-

114

BENKLER,

supra note 7, at 19.
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determination in its own right. Il5
Copyright should promote
participation in culture for the sake of culture as well as for the sake of
political freedom.
By foregrounding the material and spatial realities of cultural
processes, the decentered model of creativity simultaneously provides
a firmer foundation for articulating the structural connections between
copyright, cultural play, and social justice. Simply put, overly broad
copyright exacerbates the structural effects of unequal access to
cultural resources by placing additional obstacles in the path to
cultural participation. Narrower copyright avoids this risk in some
cases, and also works in the opposite direction. In removing obstacles
to cultural participation, narrower copyright broadens and deepens a
society's capacity for cultural progress. 116 Economically oriented
intellectual property theorists are apt to characterize (properly
calibrated) intellectual property protection as creating a virtuous circle
of creation and investment. We can think of the decentered model of
creativity as describing a virtuous circle of a different sort, in which
greater allowance for play in access to and use of cultural resources
promotes substantive equality and equality multiplies the possibilities
for the progress of a vibrant collective culture.
V.

COPYRIGHT FOR CREATIVITY: AN EXAMPLE

What, finally, can rethinking the relationship between copyright and
creativity teach us about the analysis of specific problems in copyright
law and policy? The argument that I have developed suggests an
approach grounded in careful, contextualized analysis and skeptical of
arguments from abstract virtues like liberty and desert. This approach
would resist broad formulations of protected rights and prohibited
actions, and instead would attempt to divide entitlements more clearly
and equitably between authors and others via pragmatic line-drawing.
Here is one example of the way in which that process might work.
In recent years, retellings of copyrighted fictional works have
generated some high-profile copyright controversies. These retellings
have appeared in a variety of contexts, ranging from commercially
marketed sequels to widely distributed but noncommercial Internet
fan fiction. In The Wind Done Gone, Alice Randall related the story of
Margaret Mitchell's Gone with the Wind in the voice of a new character,
the slave half-sister of Southern belle Scarlett O'Hara. When the
Sunder, supra note 14, at 328-332.
See BENKLER, supra note 7, at 317-28 (peer production of knowledge goods);
Chon, supra note 14, at 2893-2900 (access to educational materials).
llS

116
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Mitchell estate sued to block publication, Randall's publisher
successfully defended her book as a fair use parody of Mitchell's. 117
Every day, on thousands of Internet sites, fans of popular television
shows, movies, and books share their own retellings of those works.
Fan fiction runs the gamut from juvenile to sophisticated. Some fans
seek to create narratives that are continuous with those in the original
works, but many do not. 1l8 While some copyright owners have
tolerated and even encouraged fan retellings, many have tried to shut
down fan sites. As Sonia Katyal has documented, so-called "slash"
narratives, which imagine male-on-male sexual relationships between
existing characters, have proved particularly unpopular with copyright
owners.1l9 Within the decentered model of creativity, before deciding
on the appropriate copyright treatment of these and other retellings
one would want to know more about the different contexts in which
they appear and the cultural functions that they serve. But the
standard approaches to this problem within copyright law and
copyright theory do not ask these questions at all.
Doctrinally, copyright analysis of a retelling begins by asking
whether the retelling is a "derivative work." Since that abstract,
general category is defined so broadly as to include any recasting of
the copyrighted original,12o the threshold case for infringement is easy
to make. The analysis then shifts to the question of fair use, and has
come to depend principally on two factors. First, courts inquire
whether the retelling is "transformative"; to satisfy this criterion, the
work must contain a discernible element of critical commentary. 12l
Second, they ask whether and how the retelling will affect the market
for the underlying work, including the licensing market for authorized
sequels. l22 As several perceptive commentators have noted, within the
framework of literary theory this test is broad enough to encompass
almost anything; every retelling comments on the original in one way
or another. 123 Courts, however, have resisted arguments of this sort,
SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
For descriptions, see Sonia K. Katyal, Performance, Property, and the Slashing of
Gender in Fan Fiction, 14 AM. U. ]. GENDER Soc. POL'Y &: L. 461, 463-64, 483-87
(2006); Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity,
70 LAw &: CON TEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming Winter/Spring 2007) (manuscript at Pt. II,
on file with the author).
119 Katyal, supra note 118, at 463-64.
120 See 17 U.s.c. § 101 (2005).
121 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579-83 (1994).
122 See id. at 590-93; Sun Trust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1273-76.
123 See Katyal, supra note U8, at 474-75; Tushnet, supra note 118 (manuscript at
text accompanying n.6).
117
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both because they have no obvious stopping point and because they
appear to negate the licensing inquiry. Instead, they have insisted that
claimed fair uses be more clearly identifiable with what Rebecca
Tushnet characterizes as the First Amendment value of dissent. 124
Within both economic and rights theories of copyright, insistence
on determinate rules derived from abstract first principles reinforces
the structure of the doctrinal analysis. For most economic theorists of
copyright, granting copyright owners control over the preparation and
exploitation of derivative works is broadly justified as a means of
perfecting market signals about the optimal "level" and "direction" of
investment in creative expression, and exceptions should be confined
to the few cases in which licensing could not reasonably be expected
to occur.125
In general, those scholars tend to think that the
exceptional cases can be identified by distinguishing between criticism
and mere substitution; "criticism" is unlikely to be licensed, so it is
criticism that fair use should protect. Some economically oriented
scholars think that fair use should encompass a broader range of cases
in which "spillovers" result in public benefit and are likely to prevent
efficient bargains. 126 The spillovers argument, however, provides no
determinate standard for identifying those cases; arguably, any
unauthorized sequel that is good would generate spillovers, but those
theorists seem generally unwilling to go that far. In the real world,
this objection should not be fatal; indeterminacy does not rule out
pragmatic policymaking. Within the epistemological confines of

124 See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay:
How Fair Use Doctrine Hanns Free
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L]. 535,549-52 (2004). Compare, e.g.,
Sun Trust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1270 (characterizing Alice Randall's work as "principally
and purposefully a critical statement that seeks to rebut and destroy the perspective,
judgments, and mythology of [Gone With the Wind]"), and Mattei, Inc. v. Walking
Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 802 (9th Cir. 2003) (observing that photographs
depicting Barbie as endangered by kitchen appliances or in "sexually suggestive" poses
and settings "parody Barbie and everything Mattei's doll has come to signify"), with,
e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that illustrated guide to 0.]. Simpson murder trial in style of Dr. Seuss
was not fair use because it used style only as vehicle to comment on something else),
and Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 306-11 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that sculpted
rendition of photograph of two people holding litter of puppies, characterized by
sculptor as emphasizing photograph's "banality," was not fair use because no critical
commentary was discernible).
125 See Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 ].
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 209, 227 (1983); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 200-01;
LANDES &: POSNER, supra note 3, at 110-12.
126 See Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 3, at 1056-58; Brett M.
Frischmann &: Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L REV. 257 (2007).

HeinOnline -- 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1200 2006-2007

2007]

Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory

1201

economic analysis of law, however, generalized reliance on
"externalities" tends to be perceived as signaling a lack of analytical
rigor. The problem, in other words, is not the argument itself, but
rather these theorists' inability to provide an answer in the terms that
their discipline values most highly.
Rights theorists apply different principles but reach the same results.
Like economic theorists who emphasize spillovers, rights theorists
who emphasize expressive liberty tend to favor a more expansive
interpretation of what should count as transformative critical
commentary. Once again, however, without the First Amendment
value of dissent to serve as a gUideline, this approach does not provide
a determinate test for distinguishing between permissible and
impermissible retellings, and once again this is a problem for the
theory taken on its own terms. Those who emphasize Lockean
property rights tend to feel that principles of self-ownership justify
granting copyright owners control over derivations except (again)
when free speech norms of dissent come into play. Within Lockean
theory, the basis for the distinction is not market failure but a
deontological principle of need; for most such theorists, this tends to
suggest that fair use should excuse only those retellings that can be
classified as parodies. 127
Wendy Gordon's recent effort to justify a broader range of
unauthorized retellings within the framework of Lockean property
rights is an extraordinary and thought-provoking effort that ends up
demonstrating most powerfully the need for a different framework.
Gordon seeks to expand the scope of the need-based justification for
fair use based on a theory of emotive "capture."128 On this theory,
expressive works can take such strong hold of the imagination that
others must engage in retellings to regain their own self-ownership.
That rule would excuse a much wider variety of borrOWing than the
"parody-satire distinction" or the criterion of transformative critical
commentary, but Gordon wants to argue that the rubric of need
encompasses nearly all such borrowing. She argues, therefore, that
need arises because artists "integrate the prior work into
themselves."129 But this is not an argument about Lockean need at all;

127 Cj. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.s. 569, 580-81 (1994) ("Parody
needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the
creation of its victim's (or collective victims') imagination, whereas satire can stand on
its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.").
128 See Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright Unto Caesar:
On Taking Incentives
Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75,81-87 (2004).
129 Id. at 84.
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it is not an argument that distinguishes between owned and common.
It is an argument about social need: about the inseparability of idea
and expression and the cumulative, iterative, interactive nature of
creative practice. In an effort to work around this problem in a way
that avoids harm to intellectual laborers, Gordon suggests that courts
should apply liability rules to some retellings, but only to those that
occur in contexts where "pre-use negotiation or licensing" is
expected. l3O That argument comports with the Lockean no-harm
principle, but it is no longer an argument that concerns itself with the
nature of the borrowing. As others have observed, moreover, a
compensation requirement might have the perverse effect of
suppressing those retellings that map most closely to the dissent trope.
Even though Randall distributed her work in the context of mass
market commercial publishing, where licensing has become the norm,
she most likely would not have wanted to enrich the Mitchell estate. 131
Under the decentered model of creativity, a fair use analysis of
retellings would abandon both the current criterion of
"transformative" critical commentary and the search for a determinate,
objectively derived standard of permissibility, and instead would
consider a more open-ended set of questions about the role of
retellings in the process of working through culture. Under this
approach, fan fiction of all genres would be categorically exempt from
a finding of infringement. For better or worse, fictional works are
important components of collective cultural landscapes, and anyone
who has an interest in the content of culture and the direction of
cultural progress - which is to say, anyone with a pulse - must
engage with what is already there. Personal dialogues with collective
culture begin in childhood, when children imagine themselves into
favorite fictional worlds or when they conclude, because they do not
see characters resembling themselves, that those worlds have no place
for them. m Writing fan narratives carries forward these personal
dialogues, and sharing them enables broader collective dialogues to
take shape. Fan fiction communities thus serve as important nodes for
the ongoing interchange between mass and popular culture, and this is

130 Id. at 89-91; see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination:
Copyright's
Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1,55-58 (2002) (offering similar proposal).
13l See David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy,
65 U. PITT. L. REV. 281,330-31 (2004).
132 See Anupam Chander &: Madhavi Sunder, Everyone's a Superhero: A Cultural
Theory of "Mary Sue" Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2007);
see also DOROTHY ALLISON, SKIN: TALKING ABOUT SEX, CLASS AND LITERATURE 165-81
(1994).
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so whether the point is to transport the writer into a fictional world
while leaving that world otherwise intact or to issue a broader
challenge to the terms on which the world is constructed. And fan
fiction does not threaten the economic value of the copyrighted work
at all; if anything, the reverse is true. 133 In the case of fan fiction, then,
there is no interest in economic stability to be balanced.
Commercially distributed retellings, meanwhile, would require
more careful differentiation. It seems entirely reasonable to think that
a copyright should protect the right to issue authorized sequels (albeit,
perhaps, for a much more limited period of time). The economic
stability that copyright guarantees to authors and publishers should
include the right to develop and market continuations of the story that
the author wants to tell. But it should not include, and need not
include, the right to forbid the stories others want to tell. The
justifications for allOWing others to develop and market their stories
are compelling and extend far beyond the framework elaborated by
current fair use doctrine. Retellings are an indispensable mechanism
of cultural progress. Some critically acclaimed authors have retold
their own stories,134 but many more have retold the stories of others.
Over time, the storehouses of myth become replenished by the
creations of mass culture. Indiana Jones supplants Ulysses and the
story of Ross and Rachel displaces the legend of Pyramus and Thisbe.
Even so, a rule cannot be laid down that would excommunicate the
novels of the next Joyce or the plays of the next Shakespeare. 135 For
exactly that reason, although fan fiction is a seedbed for retellings,
meaningful access to the cultural landscape requires more than just
freedom to create fan narratives. As Tushnet argues, a rule segregating
all unauthorized retellings in nonmarket spaces would deny the
essential hybridity of cultural processes. 136 The case of commercial
retellings, then, reqUires a pragmatic compromise, in which copyright
prohibits only those commercially distributed retellings that attempt
to inhabit the author's voice.
That analysis suggests, however, that more comprehensive doctrinal
revision is in order. Fair use is the most important determinant of
copyright breadth only if one takes current baselines of infringement
as given; if copyright were narrower in the first place, fair use would
See Katyal, supra note lIS, at 50S.
See LAWRENCE DURRELL, JUSTINE (1957); LAWRENCE DURRELL, BALTHAZAR (195S); .
LAWRENCE DURRELL, MOUNTOLIVE (1959); LAWRENCE DURRELL, CLEA (1960).
135 Cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., ISS U.s. 239, 251 (1903) ("A rule
cannot be laid down that would excommunicate the paintings of Degas.").
136 See Tushnet, supra note l1S (manuscript at Part V).
133
134
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have less work to do. It seems far more productive to acknowledge
that the foundational "derivative work" abstraction is both
extraordinarily broad and Singularly unhelpful in determining how
much control over retellings we might want to grant. A copyright
regime concerned more directly with the balance between economic
fixity and cultural progress would seek to replace broad, allencompassing statutory provisions and generous judicially created
tests for infringement with narrower, more clearly delimited
In this
formulations covering different kinds of derivations. 137
example, the replacement provision would grant copyright owners of
literary and audiovisual works the right to prepare for commercial
exploitation sequels of the original work. It would exclude the
preparation of sequels for noncommercial use, and would define
"sequels" to include only those works continuing the narrative voice
established by the original. That definition, in turn, would require
judicial interpretation, but a legislative history packed with examples
of real and hypothetical retellings - "If Harry Potter survives his final
year at Hogwarts, only].K. Rowling gets to sell an eighth Harry Potter
novel, but anyone can write and sell any other character's story, or a
new character's story" - could put flesh on the bare bones of the
statutory definition, and teach courts new norms of restraint.
As this example illustrates, there are points of entry within existing
copyright doctrine for a decentered model of creativity, but if taken
seriously the model demands far more sweeping changes to the fabric
of copyright law and policy. To be clear, in offering the rule described
above I do not claim either that it is perfect or that it is logically
derivable from some determinate source of bright line rules that both
economic theorists and rights theorists have overlooked.
My
argument, instead, is simply this: in cases where interests in economic
stability and cultural mobility must be balanced, an examination of
creative practice informed by social and cultural theory can indicate
the appropriate content of pragmatic compromises designed to foster
cultural mobility. Such compromises will be more effective if they
operate at copyright's baseline in the form of bright-line rules. This
137 For other suggestions in this general vein, see Cohen, supra note 69, at 162-64;
Geller, supra note 103, at 192-98; JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 180-82 (2001);
Ann Bartow, Copyrights and Creative Copying, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 75, 92-103
(2003-04); Cohen, supra note 63, at 373-74; Lydia Pallas Loren, The Changing Nature
of Derivative Works in the Face of New Technologies, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 57,
76-92 (2000); Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use
Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107, 140-43 (2001); Jessica Litman, Lawful
Personal Use (Univ. of Mich. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ. Working Paper
Series, Paper No. 06-004, 2006), available at http://ssm.com!abstract=926575.
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makes bright line rules superior even though they are imperfect. Linedrawing inevitably leaves a few cases on the "wrong" sides of lines,
and line-drawing in copyright also cuts against deeply ingrained
instincts which urge that latitude for "imitators" is unjust to authors
and owners. Yet a copyright regime capable of reaching beyond those
instincts would be truer to its stated goals than the one we now have.
The result of such a process would be a copyright regime of more
modest reach but ultimately more expansive ambition.
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